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DISCLOSING DEVIATIONS: USING
GUIDELINES TO NUDGE AND EMPOWER
PHYSICIAN-PATIENT DECISION MAKING
Melissa Ballengee Alexander*
Americans fail to receive recommended care roughly half the time, reflecting
poor decision making that threatens their health. This Article offers an innovative
solution: require physicians to disclose clinical practice guideline recommendations to patients during informed consent. Behavioral economics suggests that insisting physicians and patients discuss guidelines, before deviating from them,
could be surprisingly effective at nudging more rational care choices. At the same
time, such disclosure should also educate and empower patients, serving autonomy.
Previous scholarship on unwarranted variances in care has focused primarily on malpractice reforms, largely ignoring the role of cognitive bias and the importance of patients receiving empirically based, consensus recommendations.
This Article provides important new analysis of the connection between cognitive
bias in physician decision making and practice guidelines. It offers key insights
on aligning informed consent with patient autonomy and begins an important
dialogue on elevating the salience of guidelines, thereby improving physicianpatient decision making practices.
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INTRODUCTION
“We’re literally dying, waiting for the practice of medicine to catch up
with medical knowledge . . . . [A] thousand Americans die each week because
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the care they get is not consistent with the care that medical science tells us
they should get.”1 Americans fail to receive recommended health care almost
half of the time, and these shortcomings reflect serious problems with the decision making of both physicians and patients.2 Better adherence to clinical practice guidelines (“Guideline(s)”) would improve quality of care.3 Yet, physicians
are frequently unfamiliar with Guideline recommendations and almost never

1

Martin Sipkoff, 9 Ways to Reduce Unwarranted Variation, MANAGED CARE (Nov. 1,
2003), https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2003/11/9-ways-reduce-unwarranted-var
iation [https://perma.cc/5WTC-MF5S] (quoting NAT’L COMM. FOR QUALITY ASSURANCE,
THE STATE OF HEALTH CARE QUALITY 2003 (2003)).
2 Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2641 (2003) (“[P]articipants received 54.9 percent of
recommended care.”).
3 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST,
REPORT BRIEF 1, 4 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF] (stating these
guidelines optimize care by providing the information necessary for “selecting the best care
for a unique patient based on his or her preferences” and “aid clinicians and patients alike in
determining the best treatment options”); M. Hassan Murad, Clinical Practice Guidelines: A
Primer on Development and Dissemination, 92 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 423, 431 (2017) (“Empirical evidence shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes.”); see also Julie M. Fritz et
al., Does Adherence to the Guideline Recommendation for Active Treatments Improve the
Quality of Care for Patients with Acute Low Back Pain Delivered by Physical Therapists?,
45 MED. CARE 973 (2007) (concluding adherence to guideline for low back pain leads to better clinical outcomes and lower costs); Kimberly A. Hepner et al., The Effect of Adherence to
Practice Guidelines on Depression Outcomes, 147 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 320 (2007)
(finding that guideline adherence in depression care is linked to better outcomes); Marco
Proietti et al., Adherence to Antithrombotic Therapy Guidelines Improves Mortality Among
Elderly Patients with Atrial Fibrillation: Insights from the REPOSI Study, 105 CLINICAL
RES. CARDIOLOGY 912 (2016) (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); M.H. Wilke et al., GuidelineAdherent Initial Intravenous Antibiotic Therapy for Hospital-Acquired/Ventilator-Associated
Pneumonia is Clinically Superior, Saves Lives and is Cheaper than Non Guideline Adherent
Therapy, 16 EUR. J. MED. RES. 315 (2011) (finding that guidelines for pneumonia saved
lives, money, and were overall superior); Zachary I. Willis et al., Effect of a Clinical Practice Guideline for Pediatric Complicated Appendicitis, 151 JAMA SURGERY 1 (2016) (finding that guidelines for the management of pediatric complicated appendicitis improved patient outcomes); Achim Wöckel et al., Effects of Guideline Adherence in Primary Breast
Cancer—A 5-year Multi-Center Cohort Study of 3976 Patients, 19 BREAST 120 (2010) (finding less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients); Charlotte Z.
Woods-Hill et al., Association of a Clinical Practice Guideline with Blood Culture Use in
Critically Ill Children, 171 JAMA PEDIATRICS 157 (2017) (finding guidelines improve laboratory results for critically ill children). But see Cynthia M. Boyd et al., Clinical Practice
Guidelines and Quality of Care for Older Patients with Multiple Comorbid Disease: Implications for Pay for Performance, 294 JAMA 716 (2005) (finding that guidelines did not provide the best care for elderly patients with comorbidity).
Guidelines are statements developed by multi-disciplinary expert panels that include recommendations, based on a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and
harms of alternative care options. See 2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF, supra, at 1.
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tell patients about them.4 Even when aware of Guidelines, cognitive biases lead
physicians to discount them.5
Existing legal scholarship on unwarranted care variance has focused primarily on malpractice reforms.6 This Article will propose an innovative solution: require physicians to disclose Guideline recommendations to patients as
part of informed consent, prior to any deviation. Behavioral economics suggests that by countering cognitive biases, informed consent discussion could be
a surprisingly effective nudge toward guideline adherence.
Part I of this Article will describe widespread, unwarranted variances in
care. Part II will highlight the comparative advantage guidelines offer over ad
hoc physician-patient decision making. Next, Part III will explain how insufficient knowledge of Guidelines, cognitive biases, and lack of legal disclosure
obligation all contribute to current guideline under-adherence.7 Together, Parts
4

Michael D. Cabana et al., Why Don’t Physicians Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines? A
Framework for Improvement, 282 JAMA 1458, 1463 (1999); Donald E. Casey, Jr., Why
Don’t Physicians (and Patients) Consistently Follow Clinical Practice Guidelines, 173
JAMA INTERNAL MED. 1581, 1581–82 (2013); Naomi Fearns et al., What Do Patients and
the Public Know About Clinical Practice Guidelines and What Do They Want from Them? A
Qualitative Study, BMC HEALTH SERVS. RES., Feb. 24, 2016, at 1, 11 (finding in a Scotland
study that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the existence of guidelines, though people
are enthusiastic about them once they are made aware of them”).
5 See infra Section III.B.
6 See Ronen Avraham, Overlooked and Underused: Clinical Practice Guidelines and Malpractice Liability for Independent Physicians, 20 CONN. INS. L.J. 273, 278 (2014); Mark A.
Hall, The Defensive Effect of Medical Practice Policies in Malpractice Litigation, 54 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 119, 121 (1991); Marshall B. Kapp, Getting Physicians and Patients to
Choose Wisely: Does the Law Help or Hurt?, 46 U. TOL. L. REV. 529, 536–37 (2015); Maxwell J. Mehlman, Professional Power and the Standard of Care in Medicine, 44 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1165, 1169 (2012); Michelle M. Mello, Of Swords and Shields: The Role of Clinical
Practice Guidelines in Medical Malpractice Litigation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 645, 648 (2001).
But see Wendy Netter Epstein, Nudging Patient Decision-Making, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1255,
1283–85, 1301 (2017) (analyzing patient instability of preferences and systematic decision
making biases and mistakes and recommending that physicians frame defaults for care instead of providing a menu of options to patients); John E. Wennberg & Philip G. Peters, Jr.,
Unwarranted Variations in the Quality of Health Care: Can the Law Help Medicine Provide
a Remedy/Remedies?, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 925, 938 (2002) (proposing malpractice reforms but also recommending that physicians use informed choice rather than consent to
elicit patient values for preference-sensitive care).
7 Generally, cognitive bias in physician decision making remains an under-explored area of
legal scholarship. But see Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1189, 1189–90 (2009) (applying behavioral economics to physician decision making to consider how to structure financial incentives); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing
the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1090 (2000)
(seminal law and economics article, briefly analyzing physician decision making); Jessica
Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy, and
Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 501–05 (2013) (discussing the impact of organization
culture in light of physicians’ use of cognitive schema). But cf. Epstein, supra note 6, at
1260, 1284 n.166, 1289 (focusing on patient bias but also acknowledging that physicians
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II and III will present an important new legal analysis of the connection between cognitive bias in physician decision making and guidelines. Part IV will
argue that requiring physicians to disclose guideline recommendations to patients would improve decision making, without limiting physician discretion or
patient choice. Then, it will offer a normative perspective on why this prescriptive remedy better aligns decision making practices with the ethical principles
underlying healthcare: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.
Part IV will include significant new insights on reforming informed consent to
incorporate empiric evidence from health literacy and behavioral economics.
I.

POOR DECISION MAKING UNDERMINES QUALITY OF CARE AND
THREATENS HEALTH

For decades, scholars have recognized substantial, unjustified variances in
care approaches between physicians for patients with similar diagnoses.8 For
example, a patient with diabetes in Chicago is half as likely to receive a test
monitoring blood lipids as a similar patient in Fort Lauderdale, despite overwhelming evidence that such test should be performed.9 A patient with heart
disease in Bloomington is three times more likely to undergo bypass surgery
than a similar patient in Albuquerque.10 These wide variances exist not only between geographic regions but also between individual physicians in a single
hospital.11 While some of these variations may be explained by differences in
clinical need or patient preference, a significant percentage do not appear to be

suffer biases); Barbara A. Noah, The (Ir)rationality of (Un)informed Consent, 34 QUINNIPIAC
L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2016) (essay briefly discussing cognitive bias in the context of necessary fallibility in medical decision making); Victoria A. Shaffer, Nudges for Health Policy:
Effectiveness and Limitations, 82 MO. L. REV. 727, 728–35 (2017) (short discussion of successful physician nudges).
8 See generally John E. Wennberg, Unwarranted Variations in Healthcare Delivery: Implications for Academic Medical Centres, 325 BMJ 961 (2002).
9 THE DARTMOUTH ATLAS OF HEALTH CARE, THE QUALITY OF MEDICAL CARE IN THE UNITED
STATES: A REPORT ON THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 120–21 (John E. Wennberg & Megan
McAndrew Cooper eds., 1999).
10 Id. at 156.
11 JONATHON SKINNER & ELLIOTT S. FISHER, THE DARTMOUTH INST. FOR HEALTH POLICY &
CLINICAL PRACTICE, REFLECTIONS ON GEOGRAPHIC VARIATIONS IN U.S. HEALTH CARE 1
(2010) (“some primary care physicians order more than twice as many CT scans as their colleagues in the same practice”); Yusuke Tsugawa et al., Variation in Physician Spending and
Association with Patient Outcomes, 177 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 675, 681 (2017) (care
spending varies more across individual physicians than across hospitals and is not associated
with better outcomes); Key Issues: Racial Disparities, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, htt
p://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2942 [https://perma.cc/Y6FK-F5B
Z] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Racial Disparities] (recognizing “both
unequal treatment within a hospital or by a given provider, and unequal treatment because of
where people live”).
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so justified.12 Too often, medical practice remains divorced from scientific
method and empiric evidence.13
In fact, physicians commonly (but unintentionally) undertreat, overtreat or
mistreat patients, and the resulting costs to patients and to the U.S. healthcare
system are staggering.14 Failure to provide the recommended care contributes
to thousands of preventable deaths each year and poses a serious threat to the
health of the American public.15 In addition, this lack of adherence wastes $260
to $380 billion per year, more than the federal government spends on education, housing, and transportation combined.16 Unwarranted variance in care re12

Tsugawa et al., supra note 11, at 681 (demonstrating larger variation in spending across
physicians than across hospitals and arguing that “policies that target physicians within hospitals may be more effective in reducing wasteful spending than policies focusing solely on
hospitals”); Wennberg, supra note 8, at 962 (stating patient preferences cannot explain many
variations in practice); John E. Wennberg & Peggy Y. Thomson, Time to Tackle Unwarranted Variations in Practice, 342 BMJ 687, 687 (2011) (“[M]uch of the variation . . . is unwarranted because it isn’t explained by illness or patient preference.”). But see AM. C.
OBSTETRICIANS & GYNECOLOGISTS OPINION NO. 629, CLINICAL GUIDELINES AND
STANDARDIZATION OF PRACTICE TO IMPROVE OUTCOMES 1–2 (2015), available at https://ww
w.acog.org/-/media/Committee-Opinions/Committee-on-Patient-Safety-and-Quality-Improv
ement/co629.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20190401T1916341474
[https://perma.cc/8BY3-MPUR]
[hereinafter ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION] (contrasting necessary clinical variation based on
“age, ethnicity, weight, medical history, and desired outcome” with unwarranted variations
in care); Matthew Mercuri & Amiram Gafni, Examining the Role of the Physician as a
Source of Variation: Are Physician‐Related Variations Necessarily Unwarranted?, 24 J.
EVALUATION CLINICAL PRAC. 145, 146 (2017) (describing the view that such variation is
problematic as unsubstantiated by empirical evidence).
13 “Our medicine is run by cowboys today, where everyone is riding the range doing whatever they’re wanting to do . . . . It’s a failure at all levels . . . .” describes Dr. Steven Clark, a
professor and childbirth safety expert. Alison Young, Hospitals Know How to Protect Mothers. They Just Aren’t Doing It, USA TODAY (July 27, 2018, 1:54 PM), https://www.usatoday
.com/in-depth/news/investigations/deadly-deliveries/2018/07/26/maternal-mortality-rates-pr
eeclampsia-postpartum-hemorrhage-safety/546889002/ [https://perma.cc/B35B-CUG8].
14 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., VARIATION IN HEALTH CARE SPENDING: TARGET
DECISION MAKING, NOT GEOGRAPHY 1–2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 IOM REPORT] (finding
“[u]nderuse, misuse, and overuse of various services often put patients in danger;” geographic variations in care are substantial, pervasive, and persistent over time); Isaac D. Buck,
Overtreatment and Informed Consent: A Fraud-Based Solution to Unwanted and Unnecessary Care, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 901, 905, 908 (2016) (describing over $750 billion in
wasted healthcare spending due to overtreatment and proposing civil False Claims Act enforcement to reduce unnecessary care).
15 McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2635 (stating that failure to adhere to Guidelines “pose[s]
serious threats to the health of the American public”); see also Health Care Quality, RAND
CORP., http://www.rand.org/topics/health-care-quality.html [https://perma.cc/8BSA-KQSE]
(last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (“The gap between the care patients should get and what they actually receive likely contributes to thousands of preventable deaths each year . . .”).
16 Donald M. Berwick & Andrew D. Hackbarth, Eliminating Waste in U.S. Health Care,
307 JAMA 1513, 1513–14 (2012) (estimating failure to follow best practices in care delivery
wastes $102 billion to $154 billion and overtreatment wastes an additional $158 billion to
$226 billion per year); see also Federal Spending: Where Does the Money Go, NAT’L
PRIORITIES PROJECT, https://www.nationalpriorities.org/budget-basics/federal-budget-101/spe
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flects serious and costly shortcomings in the decision making of physicians and
patients.17
II. INCREASING THE SALIENCE OF CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES COULD
IMPROVE PHYSICIAN AND PATIENT DECISION MAKING
A. Guidelines Recommend the Best Care Approach for Most Patients
Clinical practice guidelines can help solve unwarranted variance in care by
improving the decision making of physicians and patients.18 Professional recommendations regarding appropriate care have existed in one form or other as
long as medicine has been practiced.19 The emphasis on formally adopted
Guidelines gained more salience, however, after John Wennberg’s groundbreaking research revealed unwarranted geographic disparities in care.20 The
desire to ensure rational, scientifically based medical care and to contain costs
led to increased funding of and emphasis on formal Guidelines and the comparative effectiveness research upon which they rely.21 Recently, under the Affordable Care Act, taxpayers made a $4 billion investment in these quality improvement initiatives.22
nding/ [https://perma.cc/M92P-34WN] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) (showing the government
spent $102.3 billion on education, $85 billion on transportation, and $61.5 billion on housing
and community).
17 Many factors appear to contribute to unjustified variations in care, including lack of
knowledge of the recommended approach, poor physician and patient decision making, poor
care processes, misaligned payment systems, and uncoordinated care. INST. OF MED.,
CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM: A NEW HEALTH SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 1–2 (2001)
[hereinafter IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM]; 2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4;
Casey, supra note 4, at 1582 (recommending the use of checklist-based algorithms); Effective Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/iss
ue.aspx?con=2939 [https://perma.cc/L7Z3-XLWK] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter
Dartmouth—Effective Care]; Supply-Sensitive Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE,
http://archive.dartmouthatlas.org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2937 [https://perma.cc/48V3-LS
3J] (last visited Apr. 1, 2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Supply Sensitive].
18 Even with the substantial new investment in Comparative Effective Research and Guidelines over the last decade, well-developed Guidelines do not exist for many care decisions.
Further, developing reliable scientific data to test everything that physicians do out of custom and practice is almost certainly cost prohibitive. When reliable Guidelines are unavailable, individual physician-patient decision making remains the best available approach.
19 David M. Eddy, Practice Policies: Where Do They Come From?, 263 JAMA 1265, 1265
(1990).
20 John Wennberg & Alan Gittelsohn, Small Area Variations in Health Care Delivery, 182
SCI. 1102, 1107 (1973); see also Mello, supra note 6, at 649 (recognizing the connection between Wennberg’s scholarship and emphasis on clinical practice guidelines); Wennberg, supra note 8, at 964.
21 See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1190–91.
22 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-18-311, COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS
RESEARCH: ACTIVITIES FUNDED BY THE PATIENT-CENTERED OUTCOMES RESEARCH TRUST
FUND (2018) [hereinafter 2018 GAO REPORT].
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Comparative effectiveness research (“CER”) compares outcomes between
existing health interventions to determine which provides the most benefit and
least harm, in an effort to determine the most effective practices.23 CER studies
“which standard interventions work best for whom.”24 In doing so, CER seeks
to assist physicians, patients, and policy makers to “make informed decisions to
improve health care.”25 Guidelines typically rely on CER to form recommendations for care.26
The Institute of Medicine27 (“IOM”) defines clinical practice guidelines as
“statements that include recommendations intended to optimize patient care.
They are informed by a systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the
benefits and harms of alternative care options.”28 Guidelines reflect the recommended care approach of an expert panel, based on systematic review of empiric evidence and judgments regarding the weight to give potential harms and
benefits.29 Typically, multi-disciplinary experts draft proposed Guidelines with
patient participation or input.30 Before Guidelines are adopted, they are peer
reviewed and, when necessary, revised.31 If utilized effectively, Guidelines
23

INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., INITIAL NATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR COMPARATIVE
EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 41 (2009) (“Comparative effectiveness research (CER) is the generation and synthesis of evidence that compares the benefits and harms of alternative methods to prevent, diagnose, treat, and monitor a clinical condition or to improve the delivery of
care.”).
24 Lois Shepherd, Informed Consent for Comparative Effectiveness Research Should Include
Risks of Standard Care, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 352, 352 (2017) (quoting R.R. Faden et al.,
Informed Consent, Comparative Effectiveness, and Learning Health Care, 370 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 766, 766 (2014)).
25
2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1.
26 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., CLINICAL PRACTICE GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 7
(2011) [hereinafter 2011 IOM STANDARDS].
27 The IOM was renamed the Health and Medicine Division (“HMD”) on March 15, 2016.
About Us, HEALTH & MED. DIVISION, www.nationalacademies.org/hmd/About-HMD [https:/
/perma.cc/U23T-3NBP] (last updated Jan. 16, 2018, 4:13 PM). The IOM was, and the HMD
is, part of the National Academies of Science, Engineering and Medicine (“National Academies”).
The National Academies are private, nonprofit institutions that provide independent, objective
analysis and advice to the nation and conduct other activities to solve complex problems and inform public policy decisions related to science, technology, and medicine. The Academies operate under an 1863 congressional charter to the National Academy of Sciences, signed by President Lincoln.

Id.
28

2011 IOM STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
30 K. De Boeck et al., Medical Consensus, Guidelines, and Position Papers: A Policy for the
ECFS, 13 J. CYSTIC FIBROSIS 495, 497 (2014); Murad, supra note 3, at 425.
31 Yvonne D’Arcy, Practice Guidelines, Standards, Consensus Statements, Position Papers:
What Are They, How They Differ, AM. NURSE TODAY (Oct. 2007), https://www.americannurs
etoday.com/practice-guidelines-standards-consensus-statements-position-papers-what-they-a
re-how-they-differ/ [https://perma.cc/WP6R-8Z28].
29
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have the potential to make care more scientifically-based, more rational.32 Given the magnitude of the problem with unwarranted variance in care and recent
refinements in the quality of Guidelines, Guidelines present an enormous opportunity to improve healthcare in the United States.33
Well-developed Guidelines have significant advantages over traditional, ad
hoc physician-patient decision making.34 First, they typically provide the best
available information.35 Guidelines stem from a systematic review of the latest
empiric research.36 They include easily accessible summaries of up-to-date information that can help align medical decision making with evidence from
CER.37 While some have criticized Guidelines for “freezing” a care recommendation based on then-available research, this criticism is both overstated
and largely avoidable.38 It is avoidable if Guidelines are regularly updated.39 It
is overstated in that it ignores that individual physicians are far more likely to
rely on outdated or incomplete information without Guidelines than with
them.40 After all, given the volume of new studies published monthly, practicing physicians cannot and do not read most of them.41 Certainly for the over32

Murad, supra note 3, at 425.
Id. at 431 (“Empirical evidence shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes . . . .”);
Proietti et al., supra note 3, at 917 (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wöckel et al., supra note 3, at 125
(discussing how less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients).
34 Countries around the world utilize Guidelines to improve quality of care. See GUIDELINES
INT’L NETWORK, http://www.g-i-n.net [https://perma.cc/MQ8X-B4G4] (last updated Nov.
18, 2016).
35 Dan Bang & Chris D. Frith, Making Better Decisions in Groups, ROYAL SOC’Y OPEN SCI.,
Aug. 16, 2017, at 1, 6 (“As a statistical rule of thumb, pooling information across independent individuals leads to more reliable information.”).
36 See NGC and NQMC Inclusion Criteria, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. & QUALITY, http
s://www.ahrq.gov/gam/summaries/inclusion-criteria/index.html [https://perma.cc/U4BK-HL
Q5] (last updated Oct. 2018) [hereinafter Inclusion Criteria].
37 Significantly, Guidelines include recommendations as well as evidence summaries. Id.
38 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1209 (describing how guidelines can freeze the standard of
care).
39 When a physician does read of a new study that suggests a different care approach, he or
she would also need to conduct a systematic review of all evidence in order to reach a care
recommendation based on the same quality of information as contained in Guidelines. It
would be grossly inefficient to encourage each individual physician to try to keep up with
the clinical knowledgebase this way, rather than using Guidelines.
40 This article describes out-of-date guidelines as an overstated problem in comparison to
individual physician knowledge, but it readily acknowledges that it would be unwise to increase the salience of guidelines without also ensuring adequate updating procedures. See
infra Part IV. Studies suggest that most guidelines need to be updated every three to five
years. See, e.g., Paul G. Shekelle et al., Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do Guidelines Become Outdated?, 286
JAMA 1461, 1466 (2001).
41 In fact, a study estimated that journals published “7,287 articles monthly that would need
to be considered to comprehensively and systematically update the primary care knowledgebase.” Brian S. Alper et al., How Much Effort is Needed to Keep Up with the Literature Rel33
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whelming majority of physicians and patients, paying more attention to Guidelines would considerably improve the information used to make care decisions.42
Second, Guidelines often provide superior expertise and perspective when
compared to individual physician decision making.43 Studies show that groups
typically have a greater number of different ideas and bring more specializations to decision making than individuals.44 Groups are also more likely to
make rational decisions than individuals.45 Guidelines reflect these comparative
advantages.46 They are drafted and reviewed by a group of multi-disciplinary
experts.47 They also often benefit from representative patient input in formation.48 These manifold viewpoints enable Guidelines to reflect thoughtful
consideration of diverse perspectives and expertise.
evant for Primary Care?, 92 J. MED. LIBR. ASS’N 429, 433 (2004). It would take 3.6 physicians reading full-time just to keep up. Id.
42 Nothing in this proposal would prevent a physician who did have more up-to-date
knowledge from acting on that superior information. While this article contends that physician should be required to disclose Guidelines before deviating from them, deviating remains
cheap and easy.
43 Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 6 (“[S]tudies show that, by adopting the decision favoured
by the majority of independent dermatologists, the accuracy of skin and breast cancer diagnosis can be improved over and above the single-best individual.”).
44 Jeffery B. Schmidt et al., New Product Development Decision-Making Effectiveness:
Comparing Individuals, Face-to-Face Teams, and Virtual Teams, 32 DECISION SCI. 575,
591–92 (2001). Thus, for close to 500 years, it has been commonly accepted wisdom that
two heads are better than one. See, e.g., JOHN HEYWOOD, A DIALOGUE CONTEINYNG THE
NOMBER IN EFFECT OF ALL THE PROUERBES IN THE ENGLISHE TONGUE: COMPACTE IN A
MATTER CONCERNYNG TWO MANER OF MARIAGES, MADE AND SET FOORTH (1546). On balance empiric research supports this proverb. Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 7 (“Groups have
been shown to outperform individuals for many problems of probability and reasoning.”).
However, studies do also show that groups can suffer from “groupthink,” conformity pressure that stifles divergent ideas. IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 174 (2d ed. 1982).
45 Tamar Kugler et al., Are Groups More Rational Than Individuals? A Review of Interactive Decision Making in Groups, 3 WIREs COGNITIVE SCI. 471, 478 (2012).
46 Groups tend to raise the quality of the decision making of the majority. They benefit
equally qualified participants and lower qualified participants. They may, however, paradoxically lower the decision making of any superior group members. Bahador Bahrami et al.,
Optimally Interacting Minds, 329 SCI. 1081, 1084–85 (2010).
47 Murad, supra note 3, at 425; Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36.
48 Guidelines have improved recently as a result of increased attention to patient preferences
and patient centered outcomes. The ACA introduced new funding for Patient-Centered Outcome Research Institute (PCORI), and the benefits of this new emphasis are only beginning
to be realized. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1–2. But see Melissa J. Armstrong &
Joshua A. Bloom, Patient Involvement in Guidelines is Poor Five Years After Institute of
Medicine Standards: Review of Guideline Methodologies, RES. INVOLVEMENT &
ENGAGEMENT, Oct. 2, 2017 (showing patient and public involvement with guideline development remains low five years after publication of 2011 IOM Standards). The new PCORI
funding and patient focus should help ameliorate prior concerns regarding a mismatch between research measures and patient-centered outcome goals. See Mehlman, supra note 6, at
1214–17 (highlighting concerns).
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Third, the process of Guideline creation, peer review, and adoption allows
for careful consideration of benefits, risks, and alternatives. This sort of slower,
more deliberate thinking tends to be more rational and reliable than the “thinking fast” required by individual physicians making care recommendations in
real time in exam rooms.49 Because Guidelines rest on a systemic review of
empiric evidence, include collective wisdom from a group of learned experts
and representative patients, and are formed only after a thoughtful deliberative
process, Guidelines should reflect the best care approach for most patients most
of the time.50
While skeptics often compare Guidelines to perfect decision making highlighting shortcomings, such analysis is inapposite.51 The alternative to Guideline adherence is not an idealized decision making process⎯it is decidedly
more flawed ad hoc individual physician and patient decision making.52 When
evaluating the importance and value of Guidelines, the proper question is not
whether Guidelines have challenges, but whether or not Guidelines can improve decision making vis a vis physicians and patients alone.53 The answer is
clearly yes.54
49

DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 28, 79 (2011) (discussing how time pressure and unfamiliarity make heuristic mistakes more likely); Evangelia Tsiga et al., The Influence of Time Pressure on Adherence to Guidelines in Primary Care: An Experimental
Study, 3 BMJ OPEN 1, 1 (2013) (finding “most medical decisions are taken in a context of
pressure and uncertainty” and suggesting that “experts use intuitive decision-making strategies rather than structured approaches.”).
50 2011 IOM STANDARDS: REPORT BRIEF, supra note 3, at 1, 4 (showing guidelines optimize
care by providing the information necessary for “selecting the best care for a unique patient
based on his or her preferences” and “aid clinicians and patients alike in determining the best
treatment options”); Murad, supra note 3, at 431 (“Empirical evidence shows that guidelines
improve patient outcomes . . .”); see also Fritz et al., supra note 3 (concluding adherence to
guideline for low back pain leads to better clinical outcomes and lower costs); Hepner et al.,
supra note 3 (finding that guideline adherence in depression care is linked to better outcomes); Proietti et al., supra note 3 (concluding that guideline adherence was associated with
lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wilke et al., supra note 3, at 315,
321 (finding that guidelines for pneumonia saved lives, money, and were overall superior);
Willis et al., supra note 3 (finding that guidelines for the management of pediatric complicated appendicitis improved patient outcomes); Wöckel et al., supra note 3 (finding less
guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast cancer patients); Woods-Hill et al., supra note 3 (finding guidelines improve laboratory results for critically ill children). But see
Boyd et al., supra note 3, at 720 (finding that guidelines did not provide the best care for elderly patients with comorbidity).
51 To be clear, these criticisms can be very useful in helping Guidelines to develop and improve. It is only when they are used to justify discounting or underfunding Guidelines that
they merit reconsideration.
52 Noah, supra note 7, at 698 (highlighting “necessary fallibility” in physician-patient decision making).
53 One common criticism of Guidelines is that committees form them based on empiric evidence from studies that have very narrow participation criteria, typically eliminating patients
with co-morbidities or other complicating factors. This creates challenges when applying
Guidelines in the real world where patients often present with multiple medical issues that
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B. Physician Decision Making Suffers from Structural Limitations and
Cognitive Biases
The comparative strength of Guidelines contrasts with systematic shortcomings in physician and patient decision making. Despite being held in high
regard, as compared to Guidelines, physician decision making suffers from
lower quality information, fewer viewpoints, time pressure, and cognitive biases.55 Patients receive recommended care only half of the time.56 As a result of
practice constraints, when physicians make care recommendations, they typically do so in a matter of seconds or minutes, without research, and without

may need to be factored into the determination of appropriate care. The ACA provides new
funds to begin addressing this concern, and the proposed remedy intentionally allows cheap
and easy deviations from Guidelines when physicians have a rational basis to recommend a
different care approach. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 1. However, given the magnitude and cost of the current problem with unjustified variances in care, the need for patient
differentiation should not be overstated nor should physicians disregard Guideline recommendations lightly.
54 Guideline criticisms relating to bias or conflict of interest illustrate this point. Some
Guidelines skeptics point out that there is seldom wholly impartial funding for the creation
of Guidelines. See, e.g., Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1214. While often true, there are still
several reasons to believe that Guidelines are less likely to be biased or suffer conflicts of
interest than an individual physician’s recommendation. First, Guidelines must be based on a
systematic review of empiric evidence. Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36. In contrast, an individual physician typically supplies no evidence to support his or her recommendation.
Second, Guidelines are also formed by multi-disciplinary panels, which tend to combat bias
and discrimination better than individuals. Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 7 (“While our
own biases are often hidden from ourselves, we are remarkably good at detecting others’ biases.”). In individual physician decision making, there is no such check on the individual’s
biases. Third, an individual physician often has a direct personal financial interest in a care
recommendation given. Multi-disciplinary panelists may have some financial interest in
Guidelines, but that interest is usually far more attenuated than the individual physicians’.
Moreover, diverse panelists would tend to have diverse interests, and as a result, the final
Guideline recommendation should be less subject to special interest capture than any one
individual. So, while imperfect, Guidelines should be markedly better on average than individual physicians at combatting bias or conflict of interest.
55 Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (stating most medical decisions are made under time pressure). While this article highlights flaws in physician decision making, it is written with the
utmost respect for physicians, the work that they do, and the effort they expend trying to
make the best possible healthcare recommendations. We are all human and all utilize heuristics. So, illustrating these intuitive rather than rational decision making strategies is not intended as criticism, only as necessary empiric evidence that greater deference to scientifically based, carefully considered, consensus recommendations is warranted. Physicians also
predominantly create the very Guidelines that this article suggests deserve increased prominence.
56 McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2641–42. This is a fairly crude statistic, and the exact
percentage of variances that are neither clinically supported nor based on patient preference
may be lower. Nonetheless, it is overwhelmingly clear that the percentage of patients who
are over-treated, undertreated or mistreated is far too high.
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consultation with anyone other than, at times, the patient.57 While individual
physician decision making varies both by physician and by circumstance, in
general, it lacks the reliability of Guidelines.58
The first shortcoming of physician decision making, at least as compared to
Guidelines, stems from inferior information. As discussed above, physicians
typically are not, and realistically cannot be, familiar with all of the latest empiric evidence bearing on care.59 In fact, studies show that physicians have at
least one question for every two patients that they see and leave roughly twothirds of these questions unanswered.60 So, when they make a recommendation,
it is not usually based on the best available data.61
Even if familiar with the latest research, individual physician decision
making lacks the benefit of a slower deliberative process and multiple viewpoints.62 To be successful, physicians must learn to make care decisions quickly and without collaboration with other experts.63 While perhaps necessary, the
speed and isolation of individual physician decision making render mistakes
more likely.64

57

Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (stating most medical decisions are made under time pressure).
58 Studies show that many factors such as gender, experience, and training impact individual
physician decision making. See, e.g., Karen E. Lutfey et al., Physician Cognitive Processing
as a Source of Diagnostic and Treatment Disparities in Coronary Heart Disease: Results of
a Factorial Priming Experiment, 51 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 16, 22 (2010) (finding that
physician gender and level of experience influence clinical decision making); see also Daniel
Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM.
ECON. REV. 1449, 1469 (2003) (“What is natural and intuitive in a given situation is not the
same for everyone . . . .”).
59 Alper et al., supra note 41, at 436.
60 Guilherme Del Fiol et al., Clinical Questions Raised by Clinicians at the Point of Care: A
Systematic Review, 174 JAMA INTERNAL MED. 710, 710, 712, 715–16 (2014) (“Unanswered
questions may lead to suboptimal patient care decisions.”).
61 As discussed below, many physicians also lack knowledge or familiarity with Guidelines.
62 Casey, supra note 4, at 1582 (identifying under-adherence with Guidelines as possibly
explained by reduced time for “detailed, systematic, and, hence, consistent evaluation and
treatment”); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 1 (discussing that most medical decisions are
made under time pressure).
63 Physicians also poorly predict patient preferences in on the spot care decisions. Benjamin
Moulton & Jaime S. King, Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for
Informed Patient Choice, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 85, 89–90 (2010) (stating how studies show
wide variation in patient preferences and that physicians predict such variation poorly).
64 Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 3–5 (stating time pressure and uncertainty make physician
heuristic mistakes more common). At the same time, heuristics like overconfidence can
cause physicians “to spend insufficient time accumulating evidence and synthesizing it before action.” Pat Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making: Cognitive Strategies and Detection of Bias, 9 ACAD. EMERGENCY MED. 1184, 1193 (2002).
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The complexity, uncertainty, and time pressure of physician decision making creates an environment where cognitive bias thrives.65 Cognitive biases are
systematic errors in judgment; they illustrate how actual human decision making differs from rational-agent models.66 Rational-agent models assume that
people will weigh the costs and benefits of their choices based on the information available to them and pick the choice that maximizes expected utility. 67
Behavioral economists have shown that these models often fail to predict actual
human behavior.68 Humans’ ability to make rational decisions is limited by the
complexity, novelty and costs of the decision, the cognitive limits of their
minds, and the time available to decide.69
Real decision makers are not purely or perhaps even predominantly rational.70 They make decisions using two systems simultaneously, System 1 and
System 2.71 System 1 is an “automatic mode” that involves fast thinking “with
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control.”72 System 2 is an “effortful
mode” that requires slower thinking and attention and is used for complex reasoning.73 System 1 suffers from biases and error-prone heuristics, rule of thumb
shortcuts.74 System 2 is more rational, but also slower, effortful, and of limited
capacity.75 To conserve effort and optimize performance, System 1 and System
2 regularly interact. System 1 continuously and unconsciously generates suggestions that System 2 either endorses or rejects.76 System 1 “cannot be turned
65

Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95 (showing limited
information and complexity tend to increase cognitive bias; bias “is endemic in health care
decisionmaking”); Noah, supra note 7, at 701–02 (“both physicians and patients also regularly employ biases and heuristic shortcuts . . . .”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 36,
79, 85. Some Guideline skeptics point to the intractable uncertainty of medicine to discount
Guidelines, but such uncertainty is one of the reasons Guidelines are so important. When
faced with uncertainty, decision making is more likely to reflect heuristics and biases.
66 See Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1449 (describing the “systematic biases that separate the
beliefs that people have and the choices they make from the optimal beliefs and choices assumed in rational-agent models”); see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 7.
67 Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1459.
68 Id.
69 See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 49; Judith H. Hibbard & Ellen Peters, Supporting
Informed Consumer Health Care Decisions: Data Presentation Approaches that Facilitate
the Use of Information in Choice, 24 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 413, 415 (2003) (recognizing
increased use of heuristics when information is complex or requires comparisons on multiple
variables).
70 Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95; Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1469.
71 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 24. We are not conscious of System 1, which operates automatically and too quickly for awareness.
72 Id. at 20.
73 Id. at 21.
74 System 1 “sometimes answers easier questions than the one it was asked,” without the
person realizing that this substitution has occurred. Id. at 25. Use of heuristics simplifies
choice but compromises accuracy. It leads to predictable mistakes. Id.
75 Id. at 21, 25, 35.
76 Id. at 25.

19 NEV. L.J. 867, ALEXANDER

Spring 2019]

5/27/2019 2:27 PM

DISCLOSING DEVIATIONS

881

off[,]” nor should it be.77 People need System 1 because System 2 would be
overwhelmed if asked to make all decisions.78 When decisions must be made
quickly, are unfamiliar, or involve uncertainty, System 1 plays a larger role in
decision making and, as a result, these choices reflect biases and heuristics
more often.79
Physicians tend to be highly educated, hard-working, well-intended decision makers, but they are still human. As humans, their decision making remains subject to cognitive biases.80 Accordingly, when they face complex,
novel, and uncertain decisions, with limited information and time, like which
health care alternative has fewer risks and more benefits for a particular patient,
they may rely more on their automatic system when deciding, rather than the
more deliberate and rational System⎯System 2.81 This predictably increases
the risk of biases and systematic errors in decision making.82
Medical scholars have catalogued thirty biases or failed heuristics that impair physician decision making.83 This Article uses three to illustrate common,
but unconscious, mistakes in physician decision making: status quo bias, overconfidence bias, and availability bias.84
Status quo bias refers to the natural tendency to approach a problem the
same way one has in the past, even after receiving information that suggests a
new approach would be better.85 The status quo serves as a “default” and is
“sticky,” meaning people will continue to follow it even when a purely rational
decision maker would use the new information to update their beliefs about the

77

Id.
Id. at 35; Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 14 (“Biases are the reality of our cognitive system. It is the cost we pay for efficiency.”).
79 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 79.
80 Noah, supra note 7, at 701–02; see also Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1469.
81 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 105; Jessica S. Ancker & David Kaufman, Rethinking
Health Numeracy: A Multidisciplinary Literature Review, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS
ASS’N 713, 715 (2007) (“[T]ime pressures can cause people to base decisions on rapid and
automatic affective responses”); J.S. Blumenthal-Barby & Hadley Burroughs, Seeking Better
Health Care Outcomes: The Ethics of Using the “Nudge”, 12 AM. J. BIOETHICS 1, 1 (2012)
(stating how behavioral economics explains how “decision making [is] flawed and biased in
predictable ways”); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1194–95; Mantel, supra note 7, at 479–81.
82 Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197–99; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 7, at 1085; see also
Mantel, supra note 7, at 480–84.
83 Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1186.
84 This article highlights cognitive mistakes in individual physician decision making to
demonstrate why Guidelines should be elevated in medical decision making, but as compared to patients, physicians likely have fewer cognitive errors. As experts with skill and experience, physicians on balance make fewer heuristic mistakes. KAHNEMAN, supra note 49,
at 11.
85 William Samuelson & Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J.
RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1988).
78
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best approach.86 Physicians appear to suffer from “status quo bias.”87 As a result, physicians often recommend the same care they have in the past, even after empiric evidence indicates that another alternative is more beneficial or less
risky.88 Adopting a new method takes more cognitive work and does not intuitively feel right, even when rationally it is the superior course. Status quo bias
can be so strong that “it takes an average of 17 years for evidence from randomized clinical trials to be incorporated into practice . . .”89
Stent implantation illustrates this problem.90 By 2007, clinical trials had revealed that stents neither prevent heart attacks nor extend lives in stable patients.91 Because “one in [fifty patients] will suffer a serious complication or
die as a result of the implantation procedure[,]” the evidence indicated that implanting stents not only lacked benefit but also unjustifiably risked serious
harm.92 An updated Guideline followed by 2011.93 Nonetheless, five years lat86

This problem can be especially common when considering more than two treatment options. Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192 (“[M]ultiple alternatives bias,” a variant of status
quo bias, suggests that if there are more than two care options, physicians will be even more
likely to stick with the status quo); Ezekiel J. Emanuel et al., Using Behavioral Economics to
Design Physician Incentives that Deliver High-Value Care, 164 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
114, 115 (2016) (describing how “[c]hoice [o]verload” can reinforce status quo bias for physicians); In medical literature, a contradicted claim can continue to persist in citations for a
decade after being disproven. See Athina Tatsioni et al., Persistence of Contradicted Claims
in the Literature, 298 JAMA 2517 (2007).
87 Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 2 (describing physician performance of tonsillectomies
decades after evidence showed such procedures were ineffective); Croskerry, supra note 64,
at 1192; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197–98 (discussing how physicians exhibit status quo
bias, continuing a practice even after knowledge of peer-reviewed literature demonstrating a
better care approach).
88 Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 2; Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1458, 1462; Richard G.
Frank, Behavioral Economics and Health Economics, in BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND ITS
APPLICATIONS 195, 199 (Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen eds., 2007) (noting physician
have been slow to adopt effective drugs like beta blockers and to switch to prescribing generics despite compelling evidence); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1198; Sandra H. Johnson,
Polluting Medical Judgment? False Assumptions in the Pursuit of False Claims Regarding
Off-Label Prescribing, 9 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 61, 74–82 (2008) (describing how physicians continue to rely on habit even when the practice is contrary to peer-reviewed literature
raising serious safety concerns).
89 Casey, supra note 4, at 1581. This lag time may also reflect confirmation bias.
90 David Epstein & ProPublica, When Evidence Says No, but Doctors Say Yes, ATLANTIC
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2017/02/when-evidence-says-no
-but-doctors-say-yes/517368/ [https://perma.cc/BRM9-RZNS]; see also Epstein, supra note
6, at 1311 (discussing stents as an example where physician reliance on custom and practice
rather than data undermines the quality of care).
91 William E. Boden et al., Optimal Medical Therapy with or without PCI for Stable Coronary Disease, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1503, 1504 (2007); see also Kathleen Stergiopoulos &
David L. Brown, Initial Coronary Stent Implantation with Medical Therapy vs Medical
Therapy Alone for Stable Coronary Artery Disease: Meta-Analysis of Randomized Controlled Trials, 172 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 312 (2012) (stating that later systematic review
of clinical trials on stent implantation reconfirming lack of benefit).
92 Epstein & ProPublica, supra note 90.
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er, nearly half of all stents implanted in stable patients were still inappropriate.94 Despite strong evidence and significant risk of serious harm, many physicians continued to follow outdated implantation practices.95 Status quo bias impedes physicians from quickly integrating innovation into practice, often at
great cost.96
“Overconfidence bias” may also impair physician decision making.97 This
bias reflects the reality that people often think they know more than they actually do and place far too much confidence in their own opinions and skills.98
Overconfidence bias appears to be endemic in medicine.99 In fact, in a study
comparing autopsy results with diagnosis, physicians who were “completely
certain” of their diagnosis turned out to be completely wrong 40 percent of the
time.100 Overconfidence leads to unwarranted care variances because when
physicians systematically overestimate their own knowledge and skill, they are
substantially less likely to change care recommendation in response to evidence

93

Glenn N. Levine et al., 2011 ACCF/AHA/SCAI Guideline for Percutaneous Coronary Intervention, 58 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY e44, e48, e91 (2011).
94 Frederick A. Masoudi et al., Trends in U.S. Cardiovascular Care: 2016 Report from 4
ACC National Cardiovascular Data Registries, 69 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1427, 1433, 1436
(2017) (stating, even after the new guideline, half of stents implanted in stable patients were
definitely or possibly inappropriate).
95 Over-implantation of stents also almost certainly reflects physician commission bias.
Commission bias makes humans want to take action once a problem has been identified,
even if no action would be more likely to maximize utility. See, e.g., Ian Scott, Errors in
Clinical Reasoning: Causes and Remedial Strategies, 339 BMJ 22, 24 (2009) (describing
commission bias as the “[t]endency to do something . . . even if intended actions are not supported by robust evidence and may in fact do harm”). It also likely reflects confirmation bias.
96 While innovation usually eventually trickles into custom and practice, the proposed remedy would speed this process by improving physician education and by nudging physician
decision making, thus improving the quality of care.
97 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 262–63 (explaining that emotional, cognitive, economic,
and social pressures all contribute to physician overconfidence); Bang & Frith, supra note
35, at 1; Eta S. Berner & Mark L. Graber, Overconfidence as a Cause of Diagnostic Error in
Medicine, 121 AM. J. MED. S2, S2 (2008); Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193; Pat Croskerry
& Geoff Norman, Overconfidence in Clinical Decision Making, 121 AM. J. MED. S24, S24
(2008) (stating overconfidence is one of the most significant cognitive biases in physician
decision making); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197.
98 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 260–63.
99 Id. at 263 (describing how social, economic, cognitive and emotional factors lead physicians to overconfidence); Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S27 (describing physician
overconfidence as common, part of the culture of medicine).
100 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 263 (discussing how, perversely, patients and organizations tend to prefer confident physicians; recognizing uncertainty is frowned upon). An example of this bias outside medicine is that 93 percent of people report that they are “above
average” drivers. Ola Svenson, Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow
Drivers?, 47 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 143, 146 (1981). Of course, almost half of them are
wrong.
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of a better approach.101 When overconfidence bias interacts with status quo bias, the effect is compounded, and physicians may find it very challenging to
respond rationally to CER or Guidelines that suggest a different treatment
method would improve care.102
Physicians may also experience an “availability bias.”103 This bias refers to
the tendency to overestimate the significance of information or experiences that
readily come to mind.104 The evidence that is the most “available” is mistaken
for being the most “relevant.”105 In physicians, this means that they may overvalue the significance of their recent or dramatic clinical experience in decision
making and under-appreciate more scientifically sound, empiric research on a
broader population.106 So, for example, when a physician’s last three patients
failed to respond to smoking cessation counseling, the physician may stop
counseling smokers because he or she considers it fruitless.107 The physician
may do so despite knowledge of empiric evidence from large, well-controlled
public health studies that physician-led smoking cessation counseling materially improves the chances that a patient will stop smoking.108 The empiric evidence simply does not resonate the way the physician’s own available experiences do.109 Especially when coupled with overconfidence bias, this can cause
physicians to subconsciously discount evidence of the best care recommenda-

101

Bang & Frith, supra note 35, at 4–5; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193 (“Overconfidence
may result in significant errors of both omission and commission and result in unwarranted
interventions, costly delays, or missed diagnoses.”); Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at
S27.
102 Unfortunately, these unconscious, cognitive biases may also be reinforced by a more
conscience risk/benefit analysis that under the current malpractice system acting consistent
with prior practice is safer, at least when such prior practice reflects the customary approach.
See Michael Frakes, The Impact of Medical Liability Standards on Regional Variations in
Physician Behavior: Evidence from the Adoption of National-Standard Rules, 103 AM.
ECON. REV. 257, 275–76 (2013) (concluding that malpractice law may discourage physician
deviations from customary practice).
103 Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1187; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1198–99; Korobkin & Ulen,
supra note 7, at 1090 (recognizing the distorting impact of the availability heuristic on physician decision making); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4.
104 See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging
Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973).
105 Id.
106 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 130 (stating personal experience tends to be more available than statistical evidence); see also id. at 249 (“ ‘Pallid’ statistical information is routinely
discarded when it is incompatible with one’s personal impressions of a case.”).
107 See Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4.
108 See McGlynn et al., supra note 2, at 2641 (counseling has the lowest rates of adherence).
109 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111 (showing small sample size bias causes humans to
suggest a more coherent explanation for extreme outcomes when none in fact exists); see
also id. at 130, 249 (recognizing common physician error of viewing patient as exception or
unique, ignoring evidence to the contrary).
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tion. These and other cognitive biases undermine purely rational decision making in even the best-intended physicians.110
Given the risk of cognitive bias in physician decision making, critics of
Guidelines who favor a more individualized care approach may want to reconsider. It is true that individuals with the same diagnosis can and do respond differently to the same care.111 However, if there is a predictable basis for such response, it should be reflected in the Guidelines.112 If there is not an established
basis to predict which individual will respond differently, evidence demonstrates that most patients will benefit from following Guideline recommendations.113 While physicians should remain free to deviate from Guidelines based
on professional judgment, they should exercise that discretion far more cautiously. After all, evidence suggests that physicians overestimate their ability to
personalize care appropriately and cognitive biases mislead physicians regarding the significance of their clinical experiences and personal impressions.114
C. Patient Decision Making Suffers from Lack of Understanding and
Cognitive Biases
Having shown how physician decision making suffers from imperfect information, limited time and perspective, and cognitive biases, it is worth examining how these same factors impact patient decision making. Unsurprisingly,
similar weaknesses exist.115 These shortcomings are greatly compounded in pa-

110

There may be ways that physicians can counter cognitive biases. This article suggests
using Guideline recommendations as defaults for care and discussing as well as documenting
any reason for deviating from Guidelines. For other suggestions, see, for example, Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1187.
111 See, e.g., Daniel C. Malone et al., The Good, the Bad, and the Different: A Primer on
Aspects of Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects, 20 J. MANAGED CARE PHARMACY 555, 555–
56 (2014).
112 The next generation of guidelines will likely include more nuanced recommendations
based on reliable individualized risk prediction and response to therapy estimates. David M.
Eddy et al., Individualized Guidelines: The Potential for Increasing Quality and Reducing
Costs, 154 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 627, 633 (2011) (stating individualized guidelines, applying readily available characteristics in a scientific way, increased quality and reduced cost
in the context of blood pressure management); Murad, supra note 3, at 429.
113 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 249; Murad, supra note 3, at 431 (“Empirical evidence
shows that guidelines improve patient outcomes . . . .”).
114 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111, 130, 249, 263. While this article highlights biases and
failed heuristics, under circumstances involving a regular environment and prolonged practice, physician’s System 1 intuitive decision making can be accurate. Id. at 11, 185, 240–41.
The challenge, of course, is that too often physician decisions are not made in this sort of
environment. This insight does, however, help to explain why physicians who perform a single procedure hundreds or even thousands of times a year have substantially better outcome
statistics than physicians who perform the same procedure infrequently.
115 Epstein, supra note 6, at 1274–85 (providing an excellent analysis of how patients suffer
from decision making bias and lack stable preferences).
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tients, however, by lack of understanding and the novelty and stress of medical
decision making.116
Turning first to information, patients receive most of the information they
use to make care decisions from their individual physician.117 As such, physicians pass down any deficiency in information to their patients.118 Unfortunately, physicians also tend to exacerbate information insufficiencies because they
often fail to convey important information they do have to patients.119 Physicians underestimate the information patients desire and also face time pressures
in conveying information.120
Patients in turn make these information inadequacies worse because they
frequently fail to understand the information their physicians do provide.121
Conveying information does not ensure comprehension, and evidence suggests
that patients routinely have trouble absorbing medical information.122 In fact,
the United States reports widespread prevalence of low health literacy.123 The
Institute of Medicine defines health literacy as “the degree to which individuals
have the capacity to obtain, process, and understand basic health information

116

Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Rational Patients? Part 1: Health and Patient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV. ECON. FOR POL’Y 11, 11 (2017).
117 Interestingly, the Internet has greatly increased the number of patients who seek information independently. See, e.g., Jessica Berg, The E-Health Revolution and the Necessary
Evolution of Informed Consent, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 589, 589, 595 (2014) (“80 percent
of US internet users have searched for [medical] information online[;]” arguing that ethical
and legal evaluation of informed consent need to catch up to the e-health revolution) (quoting Lygeia Ricciardi et al., A National Action Plan to Support Consumer Engagement Via EHealth, 32 HEALTH AFF. 376, 378 (2013)). However, such searches tend to supplement rather than supplant physician disclosures. Most patients lack the knowledge, education, and
experience necessary to conduct effective medical research, and many also lack access to the
necessary databases.
118 Scholars have long recognized the information asymmetry between physician and patient, but the information asymmetry between individual physicians and Guidelines merits
more attention. See, e.g., Greaney, supra note 7, at 1191 (describing physician-patient information asymmetry).
119 Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 87, 89–90 (demonstrating how studies show a “consistent pattern of inadequate information disclosure”).
120 Id. at 85 (“most physicians still undervalue disclosure”); Tsiga et al., supra note 49, at 4.
121 INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT’L ACADS., HEALTH LITERACY: A PRESCRIPTION TO END
CONFUSION 1–2 (2004) [hereinafter HEALTH LITERACY]; Fact Sheet: Health Literacy Basics,
U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., https://health.gov/communication/literacy/quickguide/fa
ctsbasic.htm [https://perma.cc/5AXX-3JCN] (last visited Apr. 2, 2019) [hereinafter Literacy
Basics]; see also Thaddeus Mason Pope, Certified Patient Decision Aids: Solving Persistent
Problems with Informed Consent Law, 45 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 12, 17 (2017) (discussing how
patients often do not understand the information disclosed).
122 Pope, supra note 121, at 17.
123 Literacy Basics, supra note 121 (“[o]nly 12 percent of adults have Proficient health literacy”).
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and services needed to make appropriate health decisions.”124 Nearly half of all
adults lack the health literacy necessary to make appropriate health decisions.125
Even those patients with above average health literacy may be missing critical points.126 90 percent of patients report that they are not able to grasp some
health information provided to them.127 In particular, patients lack numeracy
and the ability to process comparative risks and benefits data.128 So, due to inadequate information provided to patients and to gaps in understanding, the information patients actually utilize for medical decision making is demonstrably
less reliable than the information underlying Guidelines.
Limited time and viewpoint likewise weaken patient decision making. Patients, like physicians, typically (although not always) make healthcare decisions on the spot, without more time to think slowly and critically. Quick decision making can impair decision making results.129
Similarly, traditional physician-patient decision making lacks the diversity
of perspectives and expertise provided by the panels that draft Guidelines. The
only voice of experience and expertise patients receive, if any, is their individual physician’s, whose view may be weakened by lack of research and time to
reflect, as well as cognitive biases.130 The richness of thoughtfully considered,
multi-disciplinary perspectives and the rationality of empirically based recom-

124

HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 121, at 2; see also Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010, 42 U.S.C. § 295p(21) (2012) (“The term ‘health literacy’ means the degree to
which an individual has the capacity to obtain, communicate, process, and understand health
information and services in order to make appropriate health decisions.”). Many factors can
impact health literacy, such as education, culture, language, and cognitive ability of the patient or how well the provider conveys the information.
125 HEALTH LITERACY, supra note 121, at 1.
126 Literacy Basics, supra note 121.
127 Id. (“[N]early nine out of ten adults may lack the skills needed to manage their health
and prevent disease.”).
128 Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 713, 715 (“[M]any patients get lost in numbers
. . .” and “[m]any patients lack basic probability skills . . . .”); Epstein, supra note 6, at 1283–
84 (discussing how patients struggle with numeracy, exacerbating cognitive biases); Hibbard
& Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Russell Korobkin, Comparative Effectiveness Research
as Choice Architecture: The Behavioral Law and Economics Solution to the Health Care
Cost Crisis, 112 MICH. L. REV. 523, 540 (2014) (discussing how cognitive bias heavily influences patient decision making because patients struggle to process complex, novel, comparative information); Ellen Peters et al., Numeracy Skill and the Communication, Comprehension, and Use of Risk-Benefit Information, 26 HEALTH AFF. 741 (2007) (stating many
patients cannot perform the basic numeric tasks required to make health care decisions effectively); Lisa M. Schwartz et al., The Role of Numeracy in Understanding the Benefit of
Screening Mammography, 127 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 966, 969 (1997) (showing only 16
percent of women demonstrated numeracy; most did not accurately apply information about
risks and benefits of mammography).
129 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 79.
130 See supra Section II.B; see also infra Section III.B.
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mendations are simply missing from the traditional individual physician-patient
process.
Given limited time and the complicated, stressful, and novel nature of patient decision making, cognitive bias also flourishes.131 Scholars have identified
numerous biases and heuristics that distort patient choice.132 This Article selects three to exemplify how patient decision making predictably and systematically reflects mistakes and biases: framing effects, single factor bias, and authority bias.
First, patients suffer from framing effects.133 This means that their decision
will often be swayed by how physicians present information, rather than an objective analysis of that information.134 An example of this bias is that patients
are more likely to pick a care approach if its risks are described as “9 out of 10
patients recover” rather than “1 out of 10 patients die.”135 Rationally, the treatment has the same odds under either description, but the different descriptions
trigger different responses.136 Because patients struggle with numeracy and
tend to be loss averse, inconsequential variations in description can determine
preference.137
Patients may also suffer from single factor or “lexicographic” bias, in
which they make healthcare decisions based on one factor, ignoring all other
variables, to simplify the decision.138 For example, a low risk patient who has
been treated for breast cancer in one breast may focus only on decreasing the
risk of future breast cancer when opting for a prophylactic double mastecto131

Hibbard & Peters; supra note 69, at 415–16; Schmidt, et al., supra note 116, at 11–13;
Daniel Young, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of Behavioral Economics Can Improve Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 467–68 (2012) (showing patients’ “abilities to make ‘rational’ choices are predictably constrained, especially in situations involving complex calculations and probabilistic trade-offs.”).
132 See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1281 (using behavioral economics to describe systematic
and predictable flaws in patient decision making); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; Noah,
supra note 7, at 701–02.
133 Epstein, supra note 6, at 1276–77 (discussing how patient preferences may be constructed by frames); Greaney, supra note 7, at 1195 (recognizing the impact of framing effects);
Korobkin, supra note 128, at 534–35 (discussing that preference may be constructed in response to context, especially for novel decisions like healthcare).
134 Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1458; Ada C. Stefanescu Schmidt et al., Boundedly Rational Patients? Part 2: Health and Patient Mistakes in a Behavioral Framework, 1 J. BEHAV.
ECON. FOR POL’Y 17, 20 (2017).
135 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 1276 (describing similar interplay between loss aversion and framing effects on patients).
136 See Kahneman, supra note 58, at 1458.
137 Needless to say, the fact that patient decision making may turn on phrasing raises serious
concerns. Framing effects in literature can also influence physician decision making.
138 Korobkin, supra note 128, at 533–34 (describing lexicographic decision making in patients, especially when faced with the complex and multivariable healthcare decisions); see
also Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 416 (patients facing burdensome cognitive processes like risk and benefit trade-offs may rely on shortcuts like using a single factor to decide).
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my.139 This single factor focus may ignore increased aggregate risks of an invasive surgery. Aggregate risks include far more common but less available risks
like infection, bleeding, and psychological side effects.140 By focusing on a single factor, the patient simplifies decision making but at times at the cost of accuracy.141
Many patients also experience authority bias.142 This bias causes them to
attribute accuracy to their individual physician’s recommendation, independent
of its merit.143 It leads patients to over-estimate the validity of their physician’s
recommendation, and it is one explanation for patients’ frequent deference to
physicians’ recommendations.144 Authority bias encourages patients to simplify
choice by relying on physicians’ recommendations.145
In summary, patients are often overwhelmed by medical information they
struggle to understand. They lack numeracy and, in particular, have trouble
comprehending probabilities, which are necessary to evaluate risk and benefit
information.146 Even aside from probabilities, they struggle with evaluability
itself and poorly differentiate acceptable from unusual risks.147 Patients flounder when asked to apply different weights to several variables across multiple
options.148 This sort of novel and complex decision making strains and often
exceeds patients’ cognitive capacity.149 As a result, patients commonly employ
139

This example is intended to help explain single factor bias but not to weigh in on the
propriety of prophylactic double mastectomy. While there is ample reason to be concerned
about bias in decision making for prophylactic double mastectomies in low risk patients,
there is also considerable basis to view this choice as preference sensitive care. For some
patients, emotional wellbeing may recommend the more aggressive approach, even if biomedical risks do not.
140
See Surgery to Reduce the Risk of Breast Cancer, NAT’L CANCER INST., https://www.can
cer.gov/types/breast/risk-reducing-surgery-fact-sheet [https://perma.cc/N3MM-NDLJ] (last
updated Aug. 12. 2013). Such choice also may reflect affective bias, basing a decision on an
emotional reaction.
141 Physicians may also fall prey to single factor or lexicographic decision making.
142 In general, physicians are better decision makers than patients. Physicians have more education and experience and are less emotionally involved. So, some deference is rational, but
blind deference is not.
143 See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
1, 1, 7 (1963) (describing authority bias and its impacts).
144 See Carl E. Schneider, Bioethics with a Human Face, 69 IND. L.J. 1075, 1097 (1994)
(stating patients want to be informed but “a quite substantial number of them did not want to
make their own medical decisions”).
145 Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 419.
146 Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1284; Schwartz et
al., supra note 128, at 969. Because patients respond differently to care, risks and benefits in
medicine are often presented as probabilities. Yet, patients struggle to comprehend this
presentation.
147 Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 536, 539.
148 Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 536, 539.
149 Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 36,
59, 79 (stating efforts to analyze several attributes, to process complex or novel information,
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biases and heuristics when deciding, which simplify healthcare decisions but
compromise accuracy.150
D. From Dyad to Triad: The Ideal Role for Guidelines in Physician-Patient
Decision Making
Recognizing predictable and pervasive shortcomings in physician and patient decision making and the impact those failures have on quality of care, as
well as the potential for Guidelines to improve the process, it is time for a sea
change in how healthcare decision making occurs.151 Both physicians and patients need to reorient decision making to provide substantially more attention
and deference to the scientifically based, thoughtfully considered consensus reflected in Guidelines. Guidelines should be treated as the third leg to the stool
of healthcare decision making, bolstering traditional physician recommendation
and patient choice. The current largely ad hoc approach to medical decision
making results in over-treatment, under-treatment, and mistreatment.152 To stabilize this shaky process, physicians should incorporate Guideline recommendations as the default care approach and patients should accord Guidelines
equal respect as their individual physician’s recommendation.153
especially with limited time, causes cognitive strain and make heuristic mistakes more likely); Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715.
150 Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 715; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1281–82; Korobkin,
supra note 128, at 534.
151 See, e.g., ATUL GAWANDE, THE CHECKLIST MANIFESTO: HOW TO GET THINGS RIGHT 46
(2010) (arguing for a wholesale revision in the role of the individual doctor in a complex,
information-overloaded society and championing checklists and protocols as individual physicians come to see themselves as part of a larger health care team). Without question,
checklists and protocols improve patient care and should be part of the holistic response to
unwarranted care variances. This article endorses guideline disclosure to empower patients
because checklists and protocols alone would leave all power in the hands of physicians. See
Epstein, supra note 6 (sounding the alarm that the law of healthcare decision making has
failed to respond adequately to behavioral economics insights). In June 2018, Amazon, JP
Morgan, and Berkshire Hathaway announced that Dr. Gawande would serve as CEO of their
new joint venture to cut healthcare costs and improve quality. Angelica LaVito et al., Amazon’s Joint Health-Care Venture Finally Has a Name: Haven, CNBC (Mar. 6, 2019, 4:05
PM), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/03/06/amazon-jp-morgan-berkshire-hathaway-health-care
-venture-named-haven.html [https://perma.cc/SJG4-B5NJ].
152 2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 1.
153 A default is a pre-set course of action to follow, unless the decision maker affirmatively
specifies differently. See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS 83 (2008); see also infra Section IV.B.
While this article suggests using informed consent to reach this goal, other vehicles could
also be utilized to accomplish this end.
In 2008, Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein published a groundbreaking book, NUDGE:
IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT WEALTH, HEALTH, AND HAPPINESS, that applied behavioral
economics studies to demonstrate that most people systematically and predictably exercise
biases and mistakes in healthcare decision making. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra, at 7–8, 19
(2008). In light of these biases and mistakes, they argued that “choice architecture” should
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Of course, patients should still play a critical role in healthcare decision
making.154 Their active participation is an end in itself, and no one else can
provide the patient’s personal values and preferences.155 Moreover, aside from

be used to help people make better health choices, without controlling those choices. Id. at 6,
10–11. People should be “nudged,” but such interventions should remain “easy and cheap to
avoid.” Id. at 6. While discussing dozens of nudges, Thaler and Sunstein particularly extolled the value and benefit of setting good defaults. Id. at 8, 12, 83, 85.
In 2017, Wendy Netter Epstein published a significant article arguing that the law of
healthcare decision making had failed to respond adequately to such behavioral economic
insights. Epstein, supra note 6, at 1258. Providing a thorough and detailed analysis of patient
biases and preference instability, she challenged current emphasis on patient autonomy, and
she recommended “patient[s] be presented the default treatment for their condition, with the
default being as personalized as possible given available data.” Id. at 1301. Epstein criticized
neutral presentation of all treatment options without a recommendation and highlighted the
importance of an evidence-based approach, but she did not mention Guidelines. Id. at 1260.
This article builds off the work of Thaler, Sunstein, Epstein and many others who have advocated for using defaults to nudge better healthcare decision making with a specific, practical proposal that could be immediately implemented. The certified Guidelines prescribed in
this Article are materially different than other evidence-based defaults. First, as discussed
above, the amount of new evidence available to physicians is staggering, and it would be
literally impossible for physicians to stay abreast of all evidence of best practices relevant to
their practice. Alper et al., supra note 41, at 436. It would similarly be unwise (and arguably
a violation of due process) to impose a legal obligation on physicians to obtain and disclose
available data without specifying to a reasonable degree of certainty the contours of that data. Physicians need notice of what they are legally required to disclose. This proposal limits
the scope of required knowledge and disclosure to a manageable one and defines the disclosure obligation.
Moreover, available evidence is not of equal quality, and the difference between basing a
recommendation on available data and basing it on the consensus reached after a systematic
review of the latest evidence is dramatic. To quantify this difference in a way that still understates its magnitude, the number of Guidelines listed in the National Guideline Clearinghouse dropped 50 percent after implementation of new Inclusion Criteria in 2014, requiring
that Guidelines be based on a systematic review of the evidence. Paul G. Shekelle, Clinical
Practice Guidelines: What’s Next?, 320 JAMA 757, 757 (2018). That number would decrease still more if only certified Guidelines complying with the 2011 IOM Trustworthiness
Standards were counted (and the initial numbers were Guidelines—not all available data).
Certified Guidelines are critical to ensure that any new physician disclosure obligation is realistic, fair, and serves its intended purpose.
154 Berg, supra note 117, at 593–94 (discussing four benefits to patient participation in informed consent); see also infra Section IV.C.
155 Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 89, 94 (showing physicians poorly predict patient
preferences which vary widely); Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733–34 (showing when patients
use decision aids for preference sensitive care, they are more likely to select treatment);
Preference Sensitive Care, DARTMOUTH ATLAS HEALTH CARE, http://archive.dartmouthatlas.
org/keyissues/issue.aspx?con=2938 [https://perma.cc/Q8SP-NRNB] (last visited Apr. 2,
2019) [hereinafter Dartmouth—Preference Sensitive] (“studies show that when patients are
fully informed about their options, they often choose very differently from their physicians”).
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cost, health care decisions primarily impact the patients and generally do not
harm others.156
Likewise, individual physicians also remain vital, even when welldeveloped Guidelines exist.157 Physicians answer questions and help tailor care
to a particular patient. The individual physician determines when a Guideline
applies to a particular patient and in contrast, when co-morbidities or other biologic factors may justify a deviation.158
Guidelines are equally imperative, however. They prompt physicians and
patients to select rational, scientifically based medical care, something physicians and patients have struggled to accomplish using a traditional physicianpatient approach.
Historically, the ad hoc physician-patient decision making model made
sense. Empirically based recommendations did not exist for the overwhelming
majority of care decisions.159 Even when Guidelines did exist, they were sometimes of limited trustworthiness and could be difficult to access during decision
making.160 More recently, however, with the investment in CER and Guideline
improvement and the enormous expansion of computer use in everyday medical practice, Guidelines are ready to help revolutionize care.161 To realize the
promise of Guidelines, physician-patient decision making practices will have to
change, giving Guidelines a more central role.

156

Melissa Ballengee Alexander, Autonomy and Accountability: Why Informed Consent,
Consumer Protection, and Defunding May Beat Conversion Therapy Bans, 55 U.
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 283, 303 (2017) (discussing the importance of patient autonomy).
157 Trustworthy Guidelines still do not exist for many care decisions, but the quality of
Guidelines is increasing and should increase further as research and Guidelines funded by
the ACA’s $4 billion investment bear fruit. 2018 GAO REPORT, supra note 22, at 2.
158 Without question, there are valid reasons to deviate from Guidelines. Patient preference
may result in a different care approach, especially for preference-sensitive care. Dartmouth—
Preference Sensitive, supra note 155 (defining “preference-sensitive care” as treatment involving significant outcome trade-offs between different options). Moreover, at times, a
Guideline that ostensibly applies to a patient may not be appropriate given co-morbidities or
other biologic factors. The proposed remedy intentionally allows cheap and easy deviation
from Guidelines at the physician’s recommendation or the patient’s preference. This recognizes the importance of allowing deviations that are thoughtfully considered.
159 Murad, supra note 3, at 423–24 (discussing the history of formal guidelines).
160 Id. at 424, 429; see also Tamara Kredo et al., Guide to Clinical Practice Guidelines: The
Current State of Play, 28 INT’L J. QUALITY HEALTH Care 122, 122 (2016) (showing over
time guidelines “have shifted from opinion-based to evidence-informed, including increasingly sophisticated methodologies . . . .”).
161 See, e.g., Electronic Medical Records/Electronic Health Records, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov/nchs/fastats/electronic-medical-records.htm
[https://perma.cc/6YG4-CMQ5] (last updated Mar. 31, 2017) (showing 86.9 percent of office-based physicians use an electronic medical records system).
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III. EXPLAINING CURRENT GUIDELINE UNDER-ADHERENCE: LACK OF
KNOWLEDGE, BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, AND CURRENT LAW
Why haven’t Guidelines already dramatically improved care? The answer,
like our healthcare system more generally, is complicated. Multiple factors continue to impede progress at both the macro and micro levels. At the macro level, organizations need to develop and implement better care processes, in particular incorporating effective use of information technologies and knowledge
and skill management.162 Payment systems need reform to incentivize appropriate care and improve value.163 Organizations need to create effective teams
and better coordinate care across conditions, services, sites, and time.164 These
reforms should be part of a holistic solution but are beyond the scope of this
Article, which focuses at the micro level on individual physician and patient
decision making.165 At the micro level, the first step to improving the salience
of Guidelines will be to dramatically improve knowledge and familiarity with
Guidelines.166

162

IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 17, at 9; Casey, supra note 4, at 1582
(recommending the use of checklist-based algorithms). Such changes could greatly facilitate
Guideline adherence.
163 2013 IOM REPORT, supra note 14, at 3–4. Fee for service care contributes to overtreatment. Supply-sensitive care, “where the supply of a specific resource has a major influence on utilization rates,” reflects another aspect of these payment system problems. Dartmouth—Supply Sensitive, supra note 17. Even with better payment structures, however, financial incentives may unavoidably leave at least some conflict of interest between
physician and patients that contributes to waste and to sub-optimal care.
164 IOM CROSSING THE QUALITY CHASM, supra note 17, at 12; see also Dartmouth—
Effective Care, supra note 17.
165 While beyond the scope of this article, organizational culture can also influence physicians’ clinical decision making. See generally Mantel, supra note 7. Similarly, insurance
coverage can influence both physician and patient decision making (and distort the
healthcare market). Some who oppose a heightened reliance on Guidelines do so at least in
part because of concern over improper use of Guidelines for insurance coverage determinations. While improper use is possible, it is not inherent in Guideline disclosure. After all, the
use of Guidelines as a default for care decisions differs materially from the use of Guidelines
for coverage decisions. See, e.g., Ira Mark Ellman & Mark A. Hall, Redefining the Terms of
Health Insurance to Accommodate Varying Consumer Risk Preferences, 20 AM. J.L. & MED.
187, 191–92 (1994) (identifying practical problems with using Guidelines to define insurance contracts). This article recognizes that there are valid reasons to deviate from Guidelines. While it proposes structuring choice to encourage Guideline adherence, it also intentionally allows cheap and easy deviations.
166 Adherence varies greatly between Guidelines and between specific recommendations
within Guidelines. Marjolein Lugtenberg et al., Why Don’t Physicians Adhere to Guideline
Recommendations in Practice? An Analysis of Barriers Among Dutch General Practitioners,
4 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 4 (2009). Some Guidelines have high adherence, but for many
Guidelines, adherence remains low.
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A. Inadequate Knowledge and Familiarity Hinders Guideline Adherence
All too often physicians lack knowledge or familiarity with Guidelines.167
It is axiomatic that a Guideline cannot improve physician decision making if
the physician is not aware that the Guideline exists. Even when aware of a
Guideline’s existence, if the physician lacks familiarity with the Guideline’s
specific recommendations, the Guideline cannot significantly influence decision making.168 Any solution must incentivize improved physician knowledge
and familiarity.
Patient decision making presents the same challenge, in more pronounced
form. Even more so than physicians, patients are largely unaware of the existence of Guidelines.169 They often do not realize that empiric evidence from
comparative effectiveness research exists or that there may be carefully considered national consensus recommendations available.170 Physicians seldom disclose Guidelines to patients.171 They may discuss risks and benefits in a way
that mirrors the evidence summary contained in Guidelines, in whole or in part,
but they do not typically mention the Guidelines themselves. Most significantly, they do not usually relay the consensus recommendation contained in

167

ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12 (“implementation of protocols and guidelines
often is delayed because of lack of health care provider awareness”); Cabana et al., supra
note 4, at 1458, 1461 (“[F]or 78% of the guidelines, more than 10% of physicians are not
aware of their existence.”); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 6.
168 Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1461 (showing that, often, lack of familiarity with guidelines was more of an issue than lack of awareness); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 4
(finding, in a Dutch study, general practitioners lacked familiarity with 46 percent of key
recommendations in Guidelines).
169 Melissa J. Armstrong et al., Recommendations for Patient Engagement in Guideline Development Panels: A Qualitative Focus Group Study of Guideline-Naïve Patients, PLOS
ONE, Mar. 20, 2017, at 2 (“public awareness of guidelines is low”); Fearns et al., supra note
4, at 11 (finding in a Scotland study that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the existence
of guidelines, though people are enthusiastic about them once they are made aware of
them.”).
170 Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 2–3 (“[I]ndividuals aware of guidelines have only a
vague understanding of what they are and how they are developed.”).
171 See K. Schipper et al., Strategies for Disseminating Recommendations or Guidelines to
Patients: A Systematic Review, 11 IMPLEMENTATION SCI. 1, 2 (2016) (“patients are not aware
of the existence of recommendations,” discussing the failure to inform patients of Guidelines
and recommendations). Moreover, as physicians begin disclosing Guidelines to patients, patients will be taught to ask for them. In this way, better disclosure practices by one physician
should beget new patient expectations and demands, which should in turn help ensure that
other physicians likewise make better Guideline disclosures.
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Guidelines.172 Until physicians routinely disclose them, Guidelines cannot and
will not improve patient decision making.173
B. Cognitive Biases Explain Systematic Guideline Under-Adherence
Solving this lack of knowledge is a necessary first step in improving decision making and thereby quality of care, but it is not sufficient alone. As empiric studies have shown, even after becoming familiar with Guidelines, physicians under-adhere to them.174 Cognitive biases help to explain this systematic
and predictable under-adherence.175
The same three cognitive biases discussed previously can also explain why
physicians discount Guidelines in decision making. Status quo bias leads physicians to instinctually want to approach care the same way they have in the
past, even after becoming familiar with Guidelines that would cause a purely
rational decision maker to change treatment method.176 Status quo bias makes
physicians slow to innovate and encourages physicians to undervalue or even
ignore new Guidelines that suggest a different practice.177
Other biases explain how physicians may justify under-adherence, even
when it is not empirically warranted. When physicians who are familiar with
Guidelines deviate, they report two primary reasons (aside from macro-barriers
and patient preference): (1) belief that their own judgment is superior, at least
for a particular patient, or (2) belief that the Guideline is biased or otherwise

172

Id. Physicians may indirectly relay a Guideline recommendation if that recommendation
accords with their own recommendation, but that is not as informative as also relaying the
consensus. For patients, the evidence-based, consensus recommendation of experts reflected
in Guidelines may have special weight.
173 For efficiency and to set a more traditional default, this proposal does not require disclosure of Guidelines unless care will deviate from the Guideline recommendation. This limited
reform directly targets unjustified care variances. However, there may also be good reasons
to disclose Guidelines even when they accord with physician recommendation and patient
preference. More routine Guideline disclosure seems likely to reduce anxiety and simplify
patient decision making.
174 See, e.g., Catherine L. Chen et al., Preoperative Medical Testing in Medicare Patients
Undergoing Cataract Surgery, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1530, 1535 (2015) (citing “no difference in the prevalence of testing as compared with 20 years ago, before the introduction of
guidelines stating that routine preoperative testing for cataract surgery was not necessary,” to
conclude that publishing Guidelines alone does not necessarily change individual physician
behavior).
175 Deepika Mohan et al., Assessing the Validity of Using Serious Game Technology to Analyze Physician Decision Making, PLOS ONE, Aug. 25, 2014, at 6 (stating heuristics play an
important role in physician decision making and can help explain failure to follow Guidelines).
176 See Chen et al., supra note 174, at 1535; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1192; Emanuel et
al., supra note 86, at 115.
177 Casey, supra note 4, at 1581 (stating it takes seventeen years for evidence to be incorporated into practice).
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not sound.178 Overconfidence bias and availability bias explain why these rationales often reflect heuristic mistakes rather than sound scientific reasoning.179
Overconfidence bias leads physicians to greatly overestimate their own
skill and knowledge as compared to Guidelines.180 At least on average, physicians are wrong about having superior judgment.181 Better information, multiple perspectives, and a more deliberative process all suggest that Guidelines
usually provide higher quality care recommendations than an individual physician can. Yet, overconfidence causes physicians to question Guidelines and to
overestimate their own judgment for care.182
Similarly, “availability bias” causes physicians to doubt the soundness of
Guidelines, without adequate scientific basis. Because physicians naturally treat
available memories as most relevant, they often overestimate the importance of
their recent clinical experience.183 This leads them to question Guidelines, even
when empirically Guidelines rest on sounder scientific foundation than the individual physician’s random clinical outcomes or impression.184 So, even when
physicians are familiar with robust evidence supporting a Guideline, they may
intuitively and unconsciously discount that evidence if it contradicts their personal experiences. This causes them to systematically undervalue Guidelines.
Bounded rationality also significantly impacts patient decision making, but
in a different way. Unlike physicians, most patients are not ignoring or discounting Guidelines, they are wholly unaware of them.185 Not told that an empirically based, consensus recommendation exists and overwhelmed by the
complexity and novelty of medical decision making, most patients employ the
178

See id. at 1582; see also Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1459–61.
Guidelines are imperfect and sometimes change when better evidence comes to light or
physicians discover a reliable basis for predicting more individualized risk. Nonetheless,
empiric evidence establishes that guideline adherence improves patient outcomes and that
physicians overestimate their own ability to determine appropriate individual deviations. See
Murad, supra note 3, at 429.
180 KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 263; Berner & Graber, supra note 97, at S2; Croskerry,
supra note 64, at 1193; Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S27 (stating overconfidence
is one of the most significant cognitive biases in physician decision making).
181 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 249 (showing that physicians discount known base
rates when inconsistent with their impression of a particular patient on the basis that the patient is unique, despite evidence that belies this exceptionalism).
182 Berner & Graber, supra note 97, at S2; Croskerry, supra note 64, at 1193; Croskerry &
Norman, supra note 97, at S27; Greaney, supra note 7, at 1197; see KAHNEMAN, supra note
49, at 262–63.
183 See KAHNEMAN, supra note 49, at 111, 130, 249.
184 See id. at 249.
185 Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 2–3 (showing that “public awareness of guidelines is
low and that individuals aware of guidelines have only a vague understanding of what they
are and how they are developed”); Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 11 (“The public is generally
unaware of the existence of guidelines, though people are enthusiastic about them once they
are made aware of them.”).
179
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decision simplification heuristics of adopting whatever their physician recommends.186 This approach enables the patient to simplify (or even avoid) taxing
and often emotionally costly medical decisions.187
Physicians do not always make recommendations, however, and when they
do not, patients may rely on other, often even less accurate heuristics.188 If patients had a better decision simplification tool available, like Guideline recommendations, they could use it.189 Increasing knowledge of this more reliable decision simplification tool and at the same time nudging the physicians’
recommendations should have a significant impact on patient decision making.
C. Current Law Does Not Require Guideline Adherence or Disclosure
Knowing that physicians and patients systematically under-adhere to
Guidelines, the question becomes whether the law can help increase the salience of Guidelines. To answer this question, one must first understand how
Guidelines interact with laws governing malpractice and informed consent.190

186

Dartmouth—Preference Sensitive, supra note 155 (“patients commonly delegate decision-making to physicians”); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540 (“a large number of patients
employ the simple heuristic of adopting their physician’s recommendation”); see also
THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 157 (“Doctors are crucial choice architects . . .”);
Schneider, supra note 144, at 1097 (stating many patients “did not want to make their own
medical decisions”).
187 Korobkin, supra note 128, at 537–38 (discussing how trading off attributes can be difficult emotionally).
188 Physicians are not legally obligated to make care recommendations. Am. Med. Ass’n,
The AMA Code of Medical Ethics’ Opinions on Informing Patients, 14 VIRTUAL MENTOR
555, 555 (2012) [hereinafter AMA Ethics Opinion] (encouraging physicians to “make recommendations” but only recognizing an “ethical obligation to help the patient make choices
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice”); see also
Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88–89. Many physicians choose to do so, but some do
not or do not always. See Epstein, supra note 6, at 1301 (“nothing in the law requires that
physicians promote any particular option over another”).
189 Since physicians are authority figures and most patients trust and respect their physicians, some patients may continue to defer to their physicians’ recommendation, if any, even
after being told of Guidelines. This significant and, at times, blind deference to physician
recommendations explains why the law may treat the physician-patient relationship as a fiduciary one and restrict physicians’ ability to limit liability based on agreement. See, e.g.,
Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 448 (Cal. 1963).
190 Malpractice creates potential tort liability for physicians who cause harm when they
breach the standard of care. While states vary in the exact approach, most define the standard
of care by what a reasonably prudent or minimally competent physician would have done
under similar circumstances. See, e.g., Locke v. Pachtman, 521 N.W.2d 786, 791 (Mich.
1994) (stating that the standard of care is determined by what a “reasonably prudent” physician would have done); McCarty v. Mladineo, 636 So. 2d 377, 381 (Miss. 1994) (stating that
the standard of care is set by what a “reasonably prudent, minimally competent” physician
would have done); McCourt v. Abernathy, 457 S.E.2d 603, 607 (S.C. 1995) (stating that the
standard of care is “determined by what an ordinary careful and prudent physician would
have done”).

19 NEV. L.J. 867, ALEXANDER

898

5/27/2019 2:27 PM

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:3

In malpractice cases, the enforceability of Guidelines varies by state and, to
some extent, by practice area.191 However, most courts have held that Guidelines regarding a practice are probative, but not dispositive, evidence of the
standard of care.192 There are outlier cases; some courts have excluded evidence of Guidelines altogether and others have treated Guidelines as dispositive.193 Nonetheless, most courts treat Guidelines as “some evidence” of the
standard of care.194 So, most physicians need not adhere to Guidelines to avoid
malpractice liability, and conversely, adhering to Guidelines does not generally
provide a safe harbor from such liability.195

This standard, heavily influenced by custom and practice, relies on expert testimony and
does not typically include survey or other empiric evidence of what other similar practitioners are doing (or have done). See Tim Cramm et al., Ascertaining Customary Care in Malpractice Cases: Asking Those Who Know, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 699, 711–12 (2002); see
also Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1184–86.
In some cases, courts have held that, if a physician can establish that he acted in accordance
with generally recognized and accepted practice, the plaintiff cannot prevail even if the
plaintiff proves that the prevailing practice is ineffective or otherwise undesirable. See, e.g.,
Doe v. Am. Red Cross Blood Servs., 377 S.E.2d 323, 326 (S.C. 1989) (finding that a professional has no liability for failure to screen blood for HIV when screening was not customary
practice). Recently, however, many states have moved from a purely custom-based standard
of care to incorporate more of a reasonable physician standard, asking not just what physicians ordinarily do but also what they should do. MARK A. HALL ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW
AND ETHICS 292 (9th ed. 2018).
191 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35; see also Conn v. United States,
880 F. Supp. 2d 741, 747 (S.D. Miss. 2012) (holding that experts may rely on clinical practice guidelines).
192 Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35 (summarizing reported cases from
1995-2011, the overwhelming majority of which treated Guidelines as “some evidence” of
the standard of care); Chris Taylor, The Use of Clinical Practice Guidelines in Determining
Standard of Care, 35 J. LEGAL MED. 273, 279–80 (2014) (stating that most courts have allowed introduction of guidelines as relevant but not as defining the standard of care); see
Jilek v. Stockson, 796 N.W.2d 267, 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 2010); Frakes v. Cardiology Consultants, No. 01-A-01-9702-CV-00069, 1997 WL 536949, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 29,
1997).
193 See, e.g., Conn, 880 F. Supp. 2d at 747 (holding that experts may rely on clinical practice
guidelines). But see, e.g., Liberatore v. Kaufman, 835 So. 2d 404, 405 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2003) (holding trial court abused its discretion by admitting specialty practice bulletin to
support expert testimony).
194 See Mehlman, supra note 6, at 1220–21, app. at 1233–35 (summarizing reported cases
from 1995-2011, the overwhelming majority of which treated Guidelines as “some evidence” of the standard of care); Taylor, supra note 192, at 279–80 (stating that most courts
have allowed introduction of guidelines as relevant but not as defining the standard of care);
see also Jilek, 796 N.W.2d at 275; Frakes, 1997 WL 536949, at *5.
195 See Avraham, supra note 6, at 300–02 (showing only twenty-eight cases of successful
guideline use in malpractice cases from 2000 to 2010). From 1989 to 1999, Maine experimented with using guidelines as a defense or safe harbor for malpractice. Id. at 305–06. Florida has also tried a more limited safe harbor initiative for caesarian sections. Neither initiative appeared to significantly impact physician behavior. Id. at 306–07. Most states do not
recognize an express “safe harbor” for guideline compliance.
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One might expect nonetheless that, at minimum, physicians would be required to disclose Guidelines to patients given Guidelines’ potential value to
medical decision making.196 This does not appear to be the case. While no case
has considered this question directly and there is relatively little case law delineating the scope of mandatory informed consent disclosures, existing precedent
suggests that physicians are not required to disclose Guidelines.197
States define mandatory disclosures through their informed consent
laws.198 Historically, the doctrine of informed consent traces its roots in the
United States to Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hospital, a 1914 opinion
authored by Justice Cardozo holding that patient consent must precede medical
care.199 The decision in Schloendorff was based largely on the ethical principle
of bodily integrity and the legal principle of avoiding battery.200 Over time, as
physician paternalism has waned and patient autonomy grown, informed consent has evolved and expanded.201 Today, informed consent rests on the ethical
norm of autonomy, as well as bodily integrity, and requires information disclosure as opposed to merely permission to touch.202
While all fifty states have informed consent requirements, states vary regarding the scope of disclosures required.203 Most states have adopted one of
two general approaches to determine the scope of the physician’s duty to disclose.204 About half of states follow the traditional “physician-based” standard,

196

The standard of care required to avoid medical malpractice cannot generally be altered
through informed consent disclosure, and the two doctrines are typically legally distinct. So,
a physician may engage in malpractice even after obtaining proper informed consent, or
conversely, a physician may be liable for breach of informed consent even if the physician’s
treatment adhered to the standard of care. HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at 409. Some states,
however, merge the two legal doctrines and discuss breach of informed consent as a type of
medical malpractice. See, e.g., Bradley v. Sugarbaker, 809 F.3d 8, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2015)
(merging lack of informed consent with malpractice).
197 Anecdotally, I would add that my physicians have never shared Guidelines with me.
198 See FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 144 (8th ed. 2018).
199 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 92–93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on
other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957).
200 Id. at 93.
201 JANET L. DOLGIN & LOIS L. SHEPARD, BIOETHICS AND THE LAW 46 (4th ed. 2019).
202 Today, informed consent typically rests on the legal doctrine of negligence or medical
malpractice rather than battery. JESSICA W. BERG ET AL., INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL
THEORY AND CLINICAL PRACTICE 46 (2d ed. 2001).
203 Nadia N. Sawicki, Mandating Disclosure of Conscience-Based Limitations on Medical
Practice, 42 AM. J.L. & MED. 85, 110–11 (2016). States also differ regarding when physicians are required to obtain informed consent. For example, some states limit informed consent requirements to surgical or other invasive treatments. Most states limit informed consent
requirements in an emergency. Id. at n.119.
204 Some scholars argue for adoption of a particular patient standard, which would rely on
the expressed values and preferences of the particular patient to determine what constitutes
“material” information. See Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law and the Forgotten Duty of
Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 559 (2000). So far, only a small number of ju-
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which imposes a duty for a physician to disclose what a reasonably prudent
physician would customarily disclose to a patient under similar circumstances.205 This physician-based disclosure standard provides wide deference to physicians to determine for themselves the amount and type of information that
should be provided.
The remaining states follow the “reasonable patient” standard.206 This
standard requires physicians to disclose the information that a reasonable patient in the plaintiff’s position would deem material under the circumstances.207
In 1972 in Canterbury v. Spence, the seminal reasonable patient standard case,
the court stated that the scope of disclosure required “must be measured by the
patient’s need, and that need is the information material to the decision.”208 The
reasonable patient standard with its “materiality” test would eventually be
adopted by approximately half of all states.209
Under either the physician-based or the reasonable patient standard, the
scope and content of the duty to disclosure remains vague and undefined. There
is no place to look up what a “reasonable patient” would consider “material”
under the circumstances or to definitively establish what a reasonably prudent
physician would customarily disclose.210 Case law in this area remains factsensitive and relatively sparse. So, it is hard to draw conclusions with certainty.
1. Physician-Based States Almost Certainly Do Not Require Guideline
Disclosure
Nonetheless, it seems unlikely that physicians are legally obligated to disclose Guidelines in physician-based disclosure states.211 The American Medical
risdictions have adopted this “particular patient” approach. HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at
158.
205 HALL ET AL., supra note 190, at 158; see also Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 104
(Ind. 1992); Hamilton v. Bares, 678 N.W.2d 74, 79 (Neb. 2004).
206 Even within the two basic approaches to determining required disclosures, states vary
regarding the exact standard and requirements.
207 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
208 Id. at 786.
209 See Nadia N. Sawicki, Modernizing Informed Consent: Expanding the Boundaries of
Materiality, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 821, 829 (2016) (stating that approximately half of all
states follow the reasonable patient standard in informed consent cases); see also, e.g., Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 443–44 (D.C. 2007).
210 Guidelines could be instructive, as they discuss principal risks, benefits, and alternatives.
They are unlikely to be dispositive, however. Similar to the connection between Guidelines
and the standard of care, Guidelines are relevant to informed consent disclosures, but they do
not necessarily reflect customary physician practice nor what a reasonable patient may deem
material under specific circumstances.
211 Significantly, informed consent currently takes a “no harm, no foul” approach to disclosure failures. Even if a physician fails to disclose required information, the plaintiff cannot
recover unless that failure proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury. See FURROW ET AL., supra note 198, at 160–61. This requires proof that if the required information had been dis-
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Association (“AMA”) Code of Ethics requires physicians to disclose information about: “(i) the diagnosis (when known); (ii) the nature and purpose of
recommended interventions; [and] (iii) the burdens, risks, and expected benefits
of all options, including foregoing treatment.”212 Legal scholars sometimes refer to such information as the “standard risk-and-benefit disclosure,” because it
is the information typically required by informed consent.213 Since the consensus recommendation reflected in Guidelines is not a diagnosis, recommended
intervention, nor a burden, risk, or benefit of a treatment option, Guidelines appear to fall outside of the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.214 As such, they
are unlikely to be mandatory disclosures.
Some ambiguity remains regarding this result, however, because the physician-based standard turns in part on custom, typically established by expert testimony.215 While the AMA Code of Ethics may influence that expert testimony
and custom, or even be separately admissible, it is probably not dispositive itself.216 The Code of Ethics arguably tells what a physician should disclose raclosed, the patient would, more likely than not, have selected a different treatment option. Id.
The mere failure to provide adequate information for effective decision making is not actionable. Id.
Some scholars argue that informed consent should be reformed to provide a dignity-based
remedy for disclosure failures. See, e.g., Rita Barnett-Rose, Informed Consent, Psychotropic
Medications, and a Prescribing Physician’s Duty to Disclose Safer Alternative Treatments,
16 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 67, 100 (2014). This article takes no position on remedy reforms, and instead posits that changing the ethical and legal standard of informed consent
should have a meaningful impact on physician behavior even if the new duty is only nominally enforceable in tort.
212 AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS 29 (2017). The Principles of Medical Ethics
and the Opinions of the AMA Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs together make up the
AMA Code of Ethics. Code of Medical Ethics Overview, AMA, https://www.ama-assn.org/d
elivering-care/ethics/code-medical-ethics-overview [https://perma.cc/H2U6-6KVK] (last
visited Apr. 4, 2019).
213 Sawicki, supra note 203, at 111 (describing these as the “standard risk-and-benefit disclosure” that all jurisdictions require).
214 To be clear, this article posits that patients should be told that nationally certified Guidelines promulgated by a panel of experts recommend (a particular approach) based on empiric
evidence, prior to deviation from the Guideline recommendation. This statement relaying the
Guideline’s evidence-based, consensus recommendation differs from any statements relaying the risks, benefits and alternatives themselves.
215 Cramm et al., supra note 190, at 701.
216 Moreover, another provision of the Code of Ethics injects additional uncertainty into the
scope of required disclosures. In Opinion 8.08, the Code of Ethics instructs physicians to
disclose “all relevant medical information,” but then caveats that “[t]he quantity and specificity of this information should be tailored to meet the preferences and needs of individual
patients.” AMA Ethics Opinion, supra note 188, at 555. This arguably expands the scope of
disclosures but also provides significant physician discretion.
As applied to Guidelines, the existence and content of consensus recommendations seem
clearly “relevant.” Nonetheless, this type of guideline recommendation has not traditionally
been regarded as required “medical” information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681a(i) (2012) (defining “medical information”). Certainly, physicians do not seem to be disclosing guidelines.
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ther than what a reasonably prudent physician customarily would disclose. Still,
customary disclosures tend to be laxer, not more expansive, than set forth in the
Code of Ethics.217 So, Guidelines almost certainly are not currently required
disclosures in physician-based disclosure states.
2. Reasonable-Patient States Likely Do Not Require Guideline
Disclosure, Even if They Should
The question is a much closer call in states that have adopted the reasonable patient approach. Guidelines seem to be the type of information that would
be “material” to a reasonable patient, as they provide important context and
valuable information for decision making. Speaking descriptively, however,
most (but not all) courts have interpreted the scope of “material” information as
limited to the standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.218 They apply materiality to
delineate which risk, benefit and alternative must be disclosed, not to expand
disclosures to other types of information.219 Even in reasonable patient states,
few courts have found liability for failure to disclose information beyond the
standard risk-and-benefit disclosure.220 Since Guidelines are not within the

See Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 11 (finding that “[t]he public is generally unaware of the
existence of guidelines”); see also Armstrong et al., supra note 169.
217 Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 87–88.
218 See Sawicki, supra note 209, at 837 (arguing that “it is increasingly obvious that what
counts as ‘material’ information for the average patient may not [sic] captured by the common law disclosure duty.”).
219 See Duffy v. Flagg, 905 A.2d 15, 23 (Conn. 2006) (finding that a patient cannot expand
the limited disclosure required by informed consent by asking the provider more questions);
Miller-McGee v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 920 A.2d 430, 440 (D.C. 2007) (“[A]t a minimum, a
physician must disclose the nature of the condition, the nature of the proposed treatment, any
alternate treatment procedures, and the nature and degree of risks and benefits inherent in
undergoing and in abstaining from the proposed treatment.”) (quoting Crain v. Allison, 443
A.2d 558, 562 (D.C. 1982)) (alteration in original); Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d 1255, 1258
(Pa. 2001). But see, e.g., Dingle v. Belin, 749 A.2d 157, 170 (Md. 2000) (finding that informed consent requires disclosure of who will be conducting or supervising the procedure);
Johnson ex rel. Adler v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 506, 509 (Wis. 1996) (finding a
breach of informed consent duty because of a failure to disclose inexperience and substantially higher statistical risk with an inexperienced surgeon).
220 Sawicki, supra note 209, at 833. Nadia Sawicki suggests an optimal scope for required
informed consent disclosures. She contends that disclosures should include non-medical information that a reasonable patient would consider “material” if within the physician’s
knowledge and expertise and not contrary to public policy. See id. Guideline recommendations fall within Sawicki’s proposed scope. Most patients would consider them material.
They fall within physicians’ expertise, and they are not contrary to public policy.
That being said, outside of Guideline recommendations, this article expresses no opinion on
what non-medical information should be considered “material” information for healthcare
decision making. It does note, however, that clear disclosure requirements are both more effective and fairer than unpredictable ones, and that the cost of any required disclosures in
time, money, and confusion should always be weighed against the alleged benefits.
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standard risk-and-benefit disclosure, physicians are probably not legally obligated to disclose them even in reasonable patient states.221
IV. REFORMING INFORMED CONSENT TO REQUIRE GUIDELINE DISCLOSURE
WOULD NUDGE QUALITY CARE AND PROMOTE ETHICS
If the goal is to improve decision making through increasing Guidelines’
salience, the law can help by requiring disclosure of Guidelines as part of informed consent.222 This legal change would improve knowledge and familiarity
with Guidelines, and behavioral economics suggests that it should also effectively nudge physician and patient decision making toward quality care.223 Ethically, disclosure of Guidelines should better align medical decision making
practices with autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice. At minimum, patients should be told that empirically based, thoughtfully considered
consensus recommendations exist before they consent to other care that deviates from such recommendations.

221

Some commentators have suggested that the reasonable patient disclosure standard is
broader. See, e.g., Hindi E. Stohl, When Consent Does Not Help: Challenges to Women’s
Access to a Vaginal Birth After Cesarean Section and the Limitations of the Informed Consent Doctrine, 43 AM. J.L. & MED. 388, 403 (2017). Prescriptively, I may agree that it should
be, but descriptively, courts have seldom enforced it outside the context of the standard riskand-benefit disclosure. The cases evidence disconnect between broad dicta and narrow holdings, although I readily acknowledge that the fact-sensitive nature of cases in this area makes
accurate predictions difficult.
Moreover, the fact that many physicians do not perceive a legal obligation to disclose Guidelines (as they are often unfamiliar with them and almost never disclose them) is far more
significant than whether or not the physician-perception is correct. Until physicians feel obligated to disclose Guidelines, Guidelines cannot play the central role they should in
healthcare decision making. The law (or AMA ethical opinion) needs to be clarified to ensure that physicians recognize an express obligation to disclose evidence-based, consensus
recommendations to patients.
222 The most efficient and effective way to implement this informed consent change would
be to revise AMA Code of Ethics Opinion 2.1.1 to include disclosure of applicable Guideline
recommendations as a fourth type of required information. See CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS,
supra note 212, at 29. This revision should influence physician practice immediately as an
ethical obligation and over time as a legal obligation, as the new standard becomes incorporated into expert testimony of what a reasonably prudent physician would customarily disclose. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1770 (1999) (extolling the benefit of using ethical
obligations for disclosure obligations in the context of conflicts of interest). Similarly, it may
take some time for courts to embrace it when interpreting what information is material to a
reasonable patient. Nonetheless, this approach would still probably be faster and at least as
efficacious as trying to adopt new laws, regulations, or precedents in all fifty states.
223 Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 2–3.
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A. Disclosure Improves Physician and Patient Knowledge of Guidelines
Mandatory disclosure should help alleviate the deficiency in physician and
patient knowledge of Guidelines.224 Physicians would have to become more
familiar with Guidelines to satisfy their legal and ethical informed consent obligations.225 Such increased familiarity alone should improve physician decision making, as physicians have better information from which to make quality
care decisions.226
Patients would likewise benefit from increased knowledge as they learn of
Guidelines from their physicians’ disclosures prior to any deviation.227 The evidence based, consensus recommendation in Guidelines will provide patients
with important context with which to critically evaluate their care options.
Guidelines tell patients what a majority of experts recommend after a systematic review of empiric evidence. To the extent the Guideline recommendation differs from their individual physician’s recommendation or their personal preference, patients need to understand this divergence. Over time, patients should
come to expect and to regularly rely on the more rational, scientifically based
Guideline recommendations in making care decisions. Improving physician and

224

ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12 (“Implementation of protocols and guidelines
often is delayed because of lack of health care provider awareness . . . .”); Cabana et al., supra note 4, at 1461 (“[F]or 78% of guidelines, more than 10% of physicians are not aware of
their existence.”); Lugtenberg et al., supra note 166, at 4; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at
1306 (requiring physicians to disclose evidence based “defaults” would educate physicians).
225 Requiring physician disclosure of the medico-legal recommendation contained in Guidelines arguably raises First Amendment concerns. However, under Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992), mandatory disclosure of
Guidelines seems more likely to be treated as regulation of professional conduct that incidentally burdens speech, which courts have traditionally upheld. In Casey, the court rejected
a free-speech challenge to an informed-consent law that required disclosure of gestation age
and the availability of printed materials from the State on financial assistance, reasoning that
the law should be understood as a regulation of professional conduct that incidentally burdens speech. Id. at 884. While National Institute of Family and Life Advocates v. Becerra,
138 S. Ct. 2361, 2375 (2018), held that a different abortion disclosure law was likely a violation of the First Amendment, the court reached this conclusion after affirming the informed
consent carve-out in Casey and finding that the disclosure law before it was “not an informed-consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct.” Id. at 2373.
Mandatory guideline disclosure looks far more like Casey than like Becerra, which involved
the regulation of pregnancy crisis centers regardless of whether or not the crisis centers offered any medical procedures. For more analysis of the First Amendment and informed consent, see Claudia E. Haupt, Professional Speech, 125 YALE L.J. 1238, 1258–60 (2016); David
Orentlicher, Abortion and Compelled Physician Speech, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 9 (2015);
Nadia N. Sawicki, Informed Consent as Compelled Professional Speech: Fictions, Facts,
and Open Questions, 50 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11 (2016).
226 Of course, correcting information shortcomings alone does not counter any cognitive biases that may impede adoption of rational, scientifically based care recommendations, but it
should still improve decision making somewhat.
227 See Armstrong et al., supra note 169, at 12–13; Fearns et al., supra note 4, at 4.
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patient knowledge of Guidelines is an essential first step in improving medical
decision making.
B. Disclosure Should Nudge Decision Making Toward Quality Care
The next step is nudging decision making to counter cognitive biases and
to make Guideline adherence the easiest cognitive path, without limiting physician discretion or patient choice. A nudge is any method of intentionally structuring choice to influence behavior in a predictable way, without controlling
that choice.228 Nudges should be “easy and cheap to avoid.”229
1. Nudging Physicians
Behavioral economics suggests that informed consent discussion of Guidelines could nudge better physician decision making in four ways.230 First, requiring disclosure of Guidelines prior to deviation sets a new and better “default” for care.231 If physicians start from the premise that Guidelines usually
provide the appropriate care approach, Guidelines should effectively act as a
default.232 Defaults are sticky, meaning that decision makers tend to defer to
them.233 So, if individual physicians treat Guideline recommendations as the
starting point, they will be less likely to recommend unwarranted variations and

228

THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 6. Choice architecture is the intentional organization of “the context in which people make decisions.” Id. at 3.
229 Id. at 6.
230 Mandatory disclosure imposes a new requirement on physicians, not merely a nudge.
The expectation, however, is that this limited disclosure requirement will also nudge physicians’ care recommendations towards greater Guideline adherence.
231 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 73; Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra
note 81, at 2–3; see also Epstein, supra note 6, at 1306 (requiring physicians to make a recommendation instead of being neutral will nudge them to be educated on the best approach).
As discussed below, priming, social nudge, and accountability justification all suggest that
disclosure could trigger physicians treating Guidelines more like defaults for care.
232 See Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 3 (“Defaults nudge not only the
actions of patients but also those of physicians.”). This default could be reinforced by preprogramed, automatically generated electronic prompts in accordance with the Guideline
approach, which could be manually changed if warranted. See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733
(recognizing the effectiveness of electronic health records preselecting the generic version of
a drug). Ideally, this default would also be strengthened by a requirement that physicians
briefly document the reason for any deviation from the Guideline in the medical records in
order to make the default stickier. See ACOG GUIDELINE OPINION, supra note 12, at 2 (suggesting that physicians should “document clearly the rationale for deviation from any recommended practice”); Kapp, supra note 6, at 540 (suggesting that physicians should be required to document the reason for any deviation in the medical record).
233 Epstein, supra note 6, at 1294.
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more likely to adhere to Guidelines, absent rational justification for deviation.234
Second, relaying the consensus view of other physicians, as stated in
Guidelines, should serve as a “social nudge,” influencing individual physicians
to adopt the Guideline position.235 Physicians, like most people, respond to peer
pressure. They tend to want to act in accordance with their peers, and reminding them when their approach differs from their peers can be quite effective at
increasing conformity.236 Since Guidelines reflect a consensus view, requiring
individual physicians to disclose that consensus recommendation prior to deviation should naturally nudge physicians to greater adherence.237
Third, the act of discussing Guidelines may also “prime” physicians to give
Guidelines greater weight.238 Studies suggest that our minds are influenced by
subconscious cues, and mentioning a concept may influence our behavior to
orient more towards that concept.239 While this area of behavioral economics is
more controversial and less well understood, studies suggest that discussing
Guidelines may actually subconsciously increase the prominence of Guidelines
in physicians’ minds, thereby influencing physicians to choose adherence more
often.
Fourth, if a physician still believes that deviating from a Guideline provides the optimal care approach, the process of having to explain why should
234

See Emanuel et al., supra note 86, at 115–17 (recognizing the need for and effectiveness
of new defaults given physician status quo bias and the benefit of setting the right action as
the “path of least resistance” given limits of willpower).
235 Id. at 116 (recognizing that physicians are “heavily influenced by their perception of how
their performance compares with those around them”); Amol S. Navathe & Ezekiel J.
Emanuel, Physician Peer Comparisons as a Nonfinancial Strategy to Improve the Value of
Care, 316 JAMA 1759, 1759 (2016) (describing social nudges as a “powerful tool to help
physicians reduce unnecessary and unjustified variations in care”).
236 See Mantel, supra note 7, at 489–90 (“physicians have a strong propensity to imitate
their peers”).
237 Some critics may worry that physicians would feel too much pressure to adhere to
Guidelines, conforming even when there is a valid reason to deviate. This result is possible
but unlikely to be common, and given the pervasive and costly under-adherence in the current system, it is a small risk well worth taking.
238 Along with setting a default and using social nudges, priming is one of the fundamental
means of influencing choice in keeping with liberal paternalism. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra
note 153, at 5, 69–71 (recognizing information, peer pressure, and priming as ways to influence behavior); Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 8 tbl.1 (recognizing defaults, social nudges, and priming as key tools to nudge and discussing how to utilize such
tools ethically).
239 Blumenthal-Barby & Burroughs, supra note 81, at 6 (recognizing the effectiveness of
priming as a means to influence healthcare decision making); Patricia S. Groves et al., Priming Patient Safety Through Nursing Handoff Communications: A Simulation Pilot Study, 39
W.J. NURSING RES. 1394, 1399, 1407 (2016) (stating early evidence suggests nurses’ behavior could be primed by safety language); Lutfey et al., supra note 58, at 16–18, 22–23 (evidencing effectiveness of priming physicians to counter cognitive bias and address unwarranted variations in context of coronary heart disease).
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serve as an “accountable justification,” helping to ensure a rational basis for
deviation.240 Studies show that actively considering contrary evidence is one of
the most effective de-biasing strategies, especially in countering overconfidence.241 Moreover, having to account to another for a decision tends to decrease heuristic mistakes.242 Requiring a physician to acknowledge that the
Guideline recommends a different approach and to explain his or her rationale
for deviation to the patient should make physician decision making more rational.243 For these reasons, behavioral economics suggests that informed consent discussion of Guidelines may be surprisingly effective at improving physician decision making.
2. Nudging Patients
Mandating disclosure of Guidelines should likewise improve patient decision making. Guideline recommendations provide patients with an optimal “default.”244 They offer an empirically based, thoughtfully considered consensus
recommendation that reflects the best choice for most patients. As such, they
present patients with a more reliable decision simplification tool and help structure choices so that the easiest cognitive path for patients corresponds to the
choice that is most likely to be beneficial. This makes it more likely that patients will make better health choices, without controlling these choices.245
In contrast, there may be no default under the current system, as physicians
are not legally obligated to provide a care recommendation and can leave patients floundering to decide.246 Even when physicians choose to make a rec240

It would be difficult to include all necessary Guideline disclosures in the generic preprinted informed consent forms patients are sometimes given before seeing a physician because Guidelines address a specific clinical circumstance. However, if physicians found a
way to do so and did not engage in any discussion with the patient about the Guidelines, this
method of disclosure would not have the same nudge for physicians or for patients.
241 Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S26 (“People’s judgments were better calibrated
(there was less overconfidence) when they were obliged to take account of disconfirming
evidence . . . . This consider-the-opposite strategy appears to be one of the more effective
debiasing strategies.”).
242 Id. at S25–26.
243 See Shaffer, supra note 7, at 731 (recognizing the effectiveness of “accountable justification” in the overprescribing of antibiotics).
244 Their physician would, of course, remain free to explain why he or she believes the
Guideline does not offer the best practice under the circumstances. Likewise, patients would
remain free to deviate from a Guideline based on their own personal preference.
245 See THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 153, at 5. But see Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E.
Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 665 (2011) (arguing that required disclosures empirically fail to improve decisions).
246 See AMA Ethics Opinion, supra note 188, at 555 (encouraging physicians to “make recommendations” but only recognizing an “ethical obligation to help the patient make choices
from among the therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice”); see also
Epstein, supra note 6, at 1301 (“nothing in the law requires that physicians promote any particular option over another”).
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ommendation, their recommendation may be less reliable than Guideline recommendations due to inadequate evidence, insufficient time, limited viewpoint,
or cognitive bias.247 So, Guidelines create a more consistent and trustworthy
default for patients.248
Mandating disclosure of Guidelines should also nudge patient decision
making through a sort of warning function. As discussed previously, having to
confront contrary evidence is an effective de-biasing tool.249 If patients have to
acknowledge Guidelines before deviating from them, this process should lead
to fewer heuristic mistakes.250 Addressing a conflict between national consensus Guidelines and an individual physician’s contrary recommendation should
help to counter authority bias. Similarly, recognizing contrary Guideline recommendations should encourage patients to reconsider how their own decisions
may be skewed by single factor bias, emotions, evaluability weaknesses, or
other mistake.251
It is worth acknowledging, however, that disclosing Guidelines may have a
cost for patients who choose to deviate anyway. While some patients will opt
for recommended care after being nudged by Guideline disclosure, those patients who still choose to deviate from Guidelines after disclosure may actually
feel worse for knowing that they are deviating.252 For at least some patients, the
nudge may evoke negative emotions like guilt or anxiety.253 Such costs, while
possible, are greatly offset by the larger benefit of improving decision making
and decreasing unwarranted variance in care.254
Requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations should improve the
knowledge and decision making of both physicians and patients, without limit-

247

See supra Section II.B.
See Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 89 (showing that without a recommendation and
discussion, patients are “vulnerable to numerous decision-making biases and effectively
cheat[ed] . . . out of an accessible expert opinion.”). Moreover, when a physician recommendation and Guideline recommendation agree, this consistency and corroboration generates an
even more persuasive default for patients.
249 Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S26; Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88 (“engaging in a treatment discussion with a physician can greatly assist patients to identify any
biases or misconceptions”).
250 See Croskerry & Norman, supra note 97, at S25–26; Moulton & King, supra note 63, at
88; Shaffer, supra note 7, at 733–34.
251 See Moulton & King, supra note 63, at 88.
252 See Edward L. Glaeser, Paternalism and Psychology, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 133, 150 (2006)
(proposing that social comparison nudges may act as an emotional tax on “bad” behavior);
Linda Thunström, Welfare Effects of Nudges: The Emotional Tax of Calorie Menu Labeling,
14 JUDGMENT & DEC. MAKING 11, 11 (2019) (finding that using calorie information to nudge
better eating emotionally taxes those with lower self-control).
253 Id.
254 Moreover, any increased internal dissonance should be no greater nor more pernicious
than a patient currently feels when going against a physician recommendation. Arguably, it
will be less because the personal relationship is removed.
248
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ing physician discretion or patient choice. It should also nudge care towards
more rational, scientifically based approaches that increase quality.255
C. Requiring Guideline Disclosure Furthers Ethical Goals and Begins
Broader Informed Consent Realignment
Physicians should also be required to disclose Guidelines to patients for
ethical reasons. Four primary ethical principles underlie the normative framework of healthcare: autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice.256
Autonomy is the principle that patients should be “free to choose” between appropriate alternative care options, including declining care.257 Beneficence is
the principle that care should “do good” for patients.258 Non-maleficence is the
principle that physicians should first “do no harm.”259 Justice is the principle
that individuals should be treated fairly and resources should be distributed equitably.260
1. Improving Decision Making Enhances Ethics
Unwarranted variance in care indicates a failure of all four ethical principles. Physicians who over-treat, undertreat, or mistreat patients often provide
no benefit, risk harm, and at least from a systemic perspective, fail to treat like
patients alike.261 Such approach is also contrary to meaningful autonomy, unless the patient understands that such care is not supported empirically nor recommended by expert consensus before consenting. Empiric evidence establish255

Ultimately, whether (or when) requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations improves knowledge and results in more recommended care poses empiric questions. These
questions can and should be answered definitively through empiric research.
256 See, e.g., TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL
ETHICS passim (5th ed. 2001) (arguing that dilemmas in bioethics should be resolved by applying the principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence, and justice).
257 See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., BIOETHICS: HEALTHCARE LAW AND ETHICS 15 (8th ed.
2018).
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 Id. at 16.
261 Unwarranted variations in care cannot be explained by discrimination alone and are
common even for privileged groups. See Steven M. Asch et al., Who Is at Greatest Risk for
Receiving Poor-Quality Health Care?, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1147, 1147 (2006) (concluding that the “differences among sociodemographic subgroups . . . are small in comparison
with the gap . . . between observed and desirable quality of health care”). Nonetheless, one
clear benefit of greater Guideline adherence should be less discrimination in healthcare. See,
e.g., Dartmouth—Racial Disparities, supra note 11 (describing racial disparities in care as a
result of failure to provide recommended care, but also noting geographic, hospital, and provider influence). Studies show that implicit bias impacts the care patients receive. See Chloë
FitzGerald & Samia Hurst, Implicit Bias in Healthcare Professionals: A Systematic Review,
BMC MED. ETHICS, Mar. 1, 2017, at 1, 13. Moving to a more scientifically based approach
should decrease this injustice.
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es that adherence to Guidelines improves patient outcomes.262 Since requiring
disclosure of Guidelines is expected to improve adherence, such reform should
bring healthcare more in line with its underlying ethical goals.
Stents provide a useful illustration.263 When physicians implant a stent in a
stable patient contrary to Guidelines, they likely provide no benefit. Stents do
not decrease the risk of heart attack nor do they extend lives.264 Moreover, because one in fifty patients suffer serious complications or die as a result of stent
implantation, contraindicated stent implantation violates the principle of nonmaleficence; it may do serious harm.265 When some stable patients receive
stents inappropriately and others do not, this also violates justice, as similarly
situated patients do not receive the same treatment.266 Mandatory disclosure of
Guidelines helps to avoid these ethical violations by nudging physicians and
patients toward recommended care, enhancing quality of care and core ethical
values.267
2. Requiring Guideline Disclosure Helps to Align Informed Consent with
Autonomy
Autonomy merits more in depth discussion. In the United States, the ethical and legal doctrine of informed consent seeks to protect patients’ autonomy
in healthcare decision making. Unfortunately, however, currently required disclosures fail to help patients make decisions that maximize individual utility.
Almost twenty-five years ago, Peter Schuck identified the significant gap between the ethical goals and reality of informed consent.268 This gap exists
largely because informed consent laws only mandate information disclosure,
while autonomous decision making requires patient understanding.269 The legal
requirements of informed consent track formal and objective disclosure instead
262

Murad, supra note 3, at 429; Proietti et al., supra note 3, at 917 (finding guideline adherence associated with lower mortality among elderly atrial fibrillation patients); Wöckel et al.,
supra note 3, at 120, 126 (showing less guideline adherence tracked lower survival in breast
cancer patients).
263 Autonomy is omitted here so that it can be discussed in greater detail below. See infra
Section IV.C.2. However, to the extent the patients who receive the contraindicated stent are
unaware of the Guideline recommendation, their autonomy has been undermined even if
they received the standard risk-and-benefits disclosure and “consented” because they were
denied critical context from which to understand their choice.
264 Stergiopoulos & Brown, supra note 91, at 312.
265 Epstein & ProPublica, supra note 90.
266 See Masoudi et al., supra note 94, at 1433 tbl.4, 1436.
267 Nudging patient decision making toward greater Guideline adherence is ethically defensible because it is welfare promoting. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Ethics of Nudging, 32 YALE
J. REG. 413, 450 (2015).
268 Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 903–05 (1994) (identifying the gap and describing it as structural and intractable).
269 Pope, supra note 121, at 17. Time constraints and economic realities also contribute to
the gap. Schuck, supra note 268, at 921–22.
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of more substantive but subjective understanding. This poses a problem because the disclosure of information is necessary for patient understanding, but it
is often not sufficient.
An arguably larger problem, however, stems from misalignment between
the type of information that is legally compelled and patient understanding.270
Empiric studies have repeatedly shown that patients cannot effectively process
the information on risks, benefits, and alternatives informed consent legally
compels.271 Weighing risks and benefits requires numeracy and evaluability
that patients lack, and expecting patients to compare risks and benefits of alternate treatment options only compounds the cognitive overload.272 It is therefore
unsurprising that patients often either defer to their physicians or use heuristics
to select a “bad” care option that fails to further their individual utility.
For too long the legal doctrine of informed consent has ignored empiric evidence regarding what patients can understand and how they make decisions.
This must change. States need to reconsider informed consent requirements
with the teachings of health literacy and behavioral economics in mind. This
will require reevaluating how and when patients are provided information and
asked to decide, as well as more traditional debates regarding what information
to provide.273 The remedy proposed in this Article is only a first step in what
should be a much broader reform of informed consent requirements.274
Requiring disclosure of Guideline recommendations should help to align
informed consent with understanding, however.275 Guideline recommendations
270

To be clear, this article does not necessarily advocate curtailing existing disclosures.
Even if most patients cannot understand them, some do. Moreover, dignity may require risk
and benefit disclosures, even when the information disclosed exceeds comprehension. Informed consent has ethical value as a process, recognizing the patient as an active agent not
merely an object of treatment, as well as for improving outcomes.
271 Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; see Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16.
272 Ancker & Kaufman, supra note 81, at 714–16; Epstein, supra note 6, at 1283–84; Hibbard & Peters, supra note 69, at 415–16; Korobkin, supra note 128, at 540; Peters et al., supra note 128, at 741; Schwartz et al., supra note 128, at 972.
273 See generally Schmidt et al., supra note 116; Schmidt et al., supra note 134. Compelling
evidence suggests that well-designed patient decision aids can improve patient understanding. Pope, supra note 121, at 13.
274 There may be good reasons to structure legal informed consent requirements so that they
are objective and predictable, even recognizing that this could leave a gap between disclosure and understanding. However, there is no justification for continuing to ignore how patients actually understand and process information. The legal doctrine should at least aim
directly at the ethical goal.
275 See Shlomo Cohen, Nudging and Informed Consent, 13 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 6, 8 (2013)
(“Not only need nudging not damage autonomy but it can enhance it . . . [It can] assist people in making choices compatible with their own goals.”); Korobkin, supra note 128, at 527
(arguing that choice architecture can be used to “increase the likelihood that the individuals
will be able to make personally utility-maximizing choices[,]” in proposing an insurance
market that he contends could enable consumers to contract for coverage that met or exceeded a certain level of cost-effectiveness); Abraham P. Schwab, Formal and Effective Autonomy in Healthcare, 32 J. MED. ETHICS 575, 579 (2006) (“[Effective autonomy] requires for-
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are far easier for patients to comprehend than traditional raw data on risks, benefits and options.276 Recommendations are simply easier to process cognitively.
They avoid the problems patients experience with numeracy, probabilities,
evaluability, and complex weighing of multi-variable factors in the standard
risks-and-benefits disclosure.277 They provide the bottom line. As a result, disclosing Guideline recommendations should help combat behavioral biases and
empower patient decision making.278
In addition to being easier to understand, disclosure of Guideline recommendations also serves autonomy by providing critical information for informed decision making.279 When there is a “right” answer empirically, as with
effective care, it is not enough to describe raw risks and benefits to patients,
then, present them with options.280 Patients also need to be told that strong empiric evidence and a national expert consensus supports a single option. Such
context is indispensable, and the failure to share it is harmful and arguably misleading.281 It suggests that all options presented are equal, setting patients up to
mal autonomy, but goes beyond it by requiring attention to the background conditions in
which decision makers will more accurately reflect their desires through their decisions. Effective autonomy is fostered if and only if biases resulting from bounded cognition are identified as risks in the decision-making processes of autonomous people and this followed by
appropriate debiasing.”).
276 In fact, physicians, who have far more education and experience than patients, overwhelmingly prefer to receive Guideline recommendations in addition to evidence summaries
of risks and benefits. Ignacio Neumann et al., Do Clinicians Want Recommendations? A
Multicenter Study Comparing Evidence Summaries with and Without GRADE Recommendations, 99 J. CLIN. EPIDEMIOLOGY 33, 37–38 (2018) (finding 86 percent of physicians preferred recommendations accompany evidence summaries of risks and benefits).
277 Some might argue that this approach could cause patients to provide too much deference
to Guidelines, and that such deference undermines rather than enhances autonomy. I disagree. Patients have so far to go before they provide Guideline recommendations with the
weight that they deserve, the risk of blindly following Guidelines is relatively small in comparison to the costs of the current approach. Moreover, providing an optimal default does not
undermine autonomy. Like glasses, a good default helps patients see, but it does not limit
patient choice any more than glasses limit sight. Patients remain free to deviate from Guidelines, cheaply and easily. They just have better information from which to decide. See Sunstein, supra note 267, at 415–16, 427, 438 (showing that ethical nudges promote informed
choice, combat behavioral biases, and educate).
278 While some may argue that nudging the recommendation undermines autonomy by removing agency, this argument misses that patients retain agency, even with a nudge, because
they retain choice. See id. at 415, 438. Moreover, since so many patients currently defer
blindly to their individual physician recommendation, improving the recommendation to
which they defer should be welfare enhancing.
279 This ethical claim is different from the others in that it does not rest on the assumption
that disclosure of Guidelines will improve knowledge, understanding, or decision making
outcomes. It claims that providing such information to patients is an ethical imperative independent of outcome based on the duty to disclose material information.
280 See Dartmouth—Effective Care, supra note 17.
281 Guidelines help patients evaluate any physician’s recommendation as well as their own
initial preferences for care.
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pick poorly or to waste significant cognitive effort struggling with what should
be an easy decision.282 While patients with idiosyncratic preferences should
remain free to pick the care option that comports with their values and preferences, the failure to disclose Guideline recommendations undermines autonomy by omitting crucial information.283
Even when Guidelines relate to preference-sensitive care, they provide patients with better information to decide in a way that is more likely to maximize
their individual utility.284 If a patient understands that the evidence is mixed regarding the best option and that the expert consensus is that patients should decide based on which risk is more important to them, that information aids decision making.285 It simplifies the decision to a more manageable one and directs
282

Improved beneficence and non-maleficence with increased Guideline adherence arguably
present the most compelling ethical argument for requiring disclosure of Guidelines prior to
deviation. However, this benefit depends on disclosure effectively changing the care actually
provided. While there is strong reason to believe that this would prove to be the case empirically, this article contends that disclosure is ethically required even if it does not materially
change care.
283 Whether government insurance or other shared cost systems should pay any added costs
associated with such care is, of course, a quite different question.
284 See Sunstein, supra note 267, at 431–32.
285 Similarly, some Guideline skeptics point to conflicting Guidelines to argue that Guidelines should not play a more prominent role. However, only a small number of Guidelines
conflict, and the conflict is usually narrow. Moreover, even conflicting Guidelines can still
provide helpful information to patients.
For example, there are conflicting Guidelines on breast cancer screening for low risk women
between the ages of 40 and 45. Compare U.S. Preventative Services Task Force Guidelines
and ACOG Guidelines, AM. COLL. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGISTS, BREAST CANCER RISK
ASSESSMENT AND SCREENING IN AVERAGE RISK WOMEN (July 2017), https://www.acog.org//media/Practice-Bulletins/Committee-on-Practice-Bulletins----Gynecology/Public/pb179.pdf
?dmc=1&ts=20181105T1829304931 [https://perma.cc/37MW-W64C] [hereinafter ACOG];
Final Recommendation Statement, Breast Cancer: Screening, U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS.
TASK FORCE (Jan. 2016), https://www.uspreventiveservicestaskforce.org/Page/Document/Re
commendationStatementFinal/breast-cancer-screening1
[https://perma.cc/W6QY-G4ZK]
[hereinafter U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS.]; Some Guidelines do not recommend routine
mammograms. ACOG, supra, at 12. Others recommend screening annually, and still others
contend that biannual screening is appropriate. Id. at 4 tbl.1. Such conflicting advice need
not be confusing or unhelpful, however. The Guidelines agree that the risk of breast cancer
for this population is relatively small and that false positive screening results, with accompanying anxiety and expense, are fairly common. Id. at 5; see also U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS.,
supra. They also agree that routine screening can detect a small number of cancers early
enough to save some lives. ACOG, supra, at 2; U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVS., supra. They disagree only regarding whether the aggregate risk associated with the common problem of
false positives outweighs the very small but also very serious risk of not catching the cancer
early enough to cure it. See ACOG, supra, at 5–6.
Narrowing recommended treatment choices and explaining the competing values should help
patients. Physicians simply need to tell patients that, under age 45, even the experts do not
agree, and so whatever seems right is an appropriate choice. Having personally been told to
get a mammogram yearly, then experienced a follow up mammogram, subsequent ultrasounds, an hour-long MRI, and ultimately a biopsy, I wish I had been told that many experts
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the patient to the most important consideration. Guideline disclosure serves an
important educational purpose.
Moreover, even if Guideline disclosure does not change the outcome of patient decision making, the process itself has ethical value. It recognizes patients
as active agents, not merely objects of treatment.286 Providing patients the information for optimal decision making accords them dignity and respect.287
Some scholars disagree. They contend that, in light of patients’ cognitive
biases and other limitations, the emphasis on autonomy in healthcare decision
making is misplaced.288 Without question, patients are imperfect decision makers, but it would be wrong to abandon or even to lessen the role of patient decision making. Aside from cost, healthcare decisions primarily impact patients
alone. Moreover, only patients can provide insight into their personal values
and preferences.289 Further, studies suggest that the process of being included
in decision making may increase patients’ knowledge, decrease patients’ anxiety, and lead to better treatment adherence.290 So, for these reasons, patient decision making, like democracy, is the worst form of decision making, except for
all the others.291 Autonomy remains an essential priority, both as an end in itself and for its ability to enhance quality of care. Physicians should be required
to disclose Guidelines to empower patient autonomy and to enhance the other
fundamental ethical principles underlying healthcare, prior to deviation.

do not recommend screening because false positives are so common. I wasn’t told and only
learned of the other Guidelines after several grueling months. While thinking I could have
avoided the anxiety of so many tests suggesting cancer and the thousands of dollars in medical co-pays may only be hindsight bias, at least I would have been informed, and it would
have been my choice.
286 This view falls within the right to health approach to health policy and practice, which
considers active participation critical to quality and acceptability of care. See generally Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, CESCR General Comment No. 14: The Right to
the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (Art. 12), ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000);
HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN A CHANGING WORLD (Michael A. Grodin et al. eds. 2013).
287 This is not intended to suggest that patients who decline such information should be
forced to receive it. Autonomy also allows patients the freedom to choose not to be informed
or to participate.
288 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 6, at 1256–58.
289 Berg, supra note 117, at 594.
290 Id.; Anne E.M. Brabers et al., What Role Does Health Literacy Play in Patients’ Involvement in Medical Decision-Making?, PLOS ONE, Mar. 3, 2017, at 1–2.
291 See The Worst Form of Government, INT’L CHURCHILL SOC’Y, https://www.winstonchurc
hill.org/resources/quotes/the-worst-form-of-government/
[https://perma.cc/5FK4-GFX3]
(last visited Apr. 4, 2019) (“Many forms of Government have been tried, and will be tried in
this world of sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed it
has been said that democracy is the worst form of Government except for all those others
forms . . . .”) (quoting Winston S. Churchill, Address at the House of Commons, (Nov. 11,
1947)).
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D. A National Entity Should Certify Guidelines to Ensure Reliability
For mandatory Guideline disclosure to realize these practical and normative goals, a neutral, independent organization will need to delineate which
Guidelines merit disclosure. Without question, some Guidelines lack trustworthiness. If there is not a system to certify well-developed Guidelines, poorly
formed and unreliable or dated Guidelines could undermine acceptance of and
deference to other Guidelines.292 Or worse, such Guidelines could hurt rather
than improve physician and patient decision making. To avoid this, an independent and neutral organization must serve as gatekeeper, and there must be a
transparent, fair, efficient, and effective certification process.293
The federal government has provided one possible model for certifying
Guidelines. Since 1999, the National Guideline Clearinghouse (“NGC”) has
published all submitted Guidelines that meet its “Inclusion Criteria” in a single
searchable database, available at no charge through the Internet.294 Since June
2014, the NGC Inclusion Criteria has required that Guidelines contain a care
recommendation designed to optimize care for a specific clinical circumstance.295 The Inclusion Criteria also demands that Guideline recommendations
be based on a systematic review of evidence and that the expert panel submit
documentation of that review.296 Guidelines must include an assessment of the
benefits and harms of care options, as well as proof that the expert panel developed, reviewed, or revised the Guideline within the past five years.297 Funding
292

See Chih-Ming Liang, Rethinking the Tort Liability System and Patient Safety: From the
Conventional Wisdom to Learning from Litigation, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 327, 373–74
(2015) (inconsistent quality of guidelines limits their legal use); Mello, supra note 6, at 653,
686–88 (describing diversity, multiplicity and unregulated sources of guidelines and the
challenges to legal use created thereby, in the context of malpractice liability); Taylor, supra
note 192, at 290 (showing bias in the development of some guidelines should limit their legal
use).
293 See 2011 IOM STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 4–5 (recommending a mechanism to identify trustworthy guidelines); Shekelle, supra note 153, at 757–58. Many developed countries
utilize a single, centralized entity to issue Guidelines. See, e.g., AUSTL. NAT’L HEALTH &
MED. RES. COUNCIL, https://www.nhmrc.gov.au [https://perma.cc/A9SV-38SA] (last visited
Apr. 4, 2019); NAT’L INST. HEALTH & CARE EXCELLENCE, https://www.nice.org.uk [https://p
erma.cc/H6BJ-EYXP] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). While there may be benefits in the United
States to allowing multiple groups to issue Guidelines, as per the status quo, the failure to
certify reliable Guidelines seems likely to jeopardize the effectiveness and to undermine the
benefits of any mandatory disclosure reform.
294 About NGC and NQMC, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RES. QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov
/gam/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/VNC4-PCZ5] (last updated July 2018); Inclusion
Criteria, supra note 36. The NGC is a website and database sponsored by the Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, originally created in partnership with the AMA and the
American Association of Plans (now America’s Health Insurance Plans).
295 Inclusion Criteria, supra note 36. This requirement contrasts with an evidence summary
alone or with more generalized recommendations.
296 Id.
297 Id.
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for the NGC expired July 16, 2018, however, and it is not yet clear what new
entity may step in to perform a similar role.298
Whether it is the NGC or another organization, in order to realize their
promise, Guidelines must be accessible in a single database that is freely available and easily searchable.299 The Guidelines included in that database must
meet the minimal NGC Inclusion Criteria and satisfy other appropriate indicia
of reliability.300 Guidelines that fail to adhere to a sufficient threshold of scien298

Shekelle, supra note 153, at 758; Guidelines and Measures Updates, AGENCY FOR
HEALTHCARE RES. QUALITY, https://www.ahrq.gov/gam/updates/index.html [https://perma.cc
/R5VJ-9582] (last updated Sept. 2018) (stating that in August 2018, AHRQ launched a one
year study to “identify new models for disseminating and accessing” Guidelines). The ECRI
Institute, a nonprofit organization that previously contracted with the federal government to
develop and maintain the NGC is now offering ECRI Guidelines Trust, a website with summarized guidelines and TRUST ratings on how well each guideline meets the IOM Standards. Haifa Kassis, The National Guideline Clearinghouse Has Closed. What’s Next?, 33
AM. MED. WRITERS ASS’N J. 133, 133 (2018); FAQs, ECRI INST., http://guidelines.ecri.org/a
sk-us [https://perma.cc/P89N-UAW4] (last visited Apr. 4, 2019). While this organization has
experience, their website currently has few guidelines because they were not able to use
NGC content. FAQs, supra. It is not yet clear whether the ECRI will adequately fill the hole
left by the NGC closing.
299 The medical profession has fought hard to retain professional self-regulation, and some
resist increased salience of Guidelines as a threat to this professional autonomy. Guidelines
should not be seen as a threat to self-regulation, however, in as much as an evolution. Physicians typically play the leading role in drafting Guidelines, and the NGC was created in partnership with the AMA. About NGC and NQMC, supra note 294; see also Amir Qaseem et
al., The Development of Clinical Practice Guidelines and Guidance Statements of the American College of Physicians: Summary of Methods, 153 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 194 (2010).
Guidelines may actually be essential to retaining professional self-regulation. Existing persistent and pervasive unwarranted variances in care are embarrassing and harmful. If physicians do not revise their practices to make care more scientifically based, they could face far
more significant challenges to self-regulation.
300 Guidelines that satisfy the NGC Inclusion Criteria may still vary substantially in quality.
This stems primarily from differences in the strength of evidence underlying them, the
strength of the recommendation contained therein, and the appropriateness of the development process. To address such differences and to improve the relevance and reliability of
Guidelines, in 2011, the Institute of Medicine published eight standards for trustworthy
Guidelines (“IOM Standards”). The IOM Standards mandate: (1) transparency, (2) disclosure and management of conflict of interests, (3) group composition, including patient participation and a multi-disciplinary panel, (4) compliance with separate IOM standards for systematic reviews of CER, (5) rating strength of evidence and of recommendation, (6) specific
and clear articulation of recommendations, (7) external review, and (8) updating. 2011 IOM
STANDARDS, supra note 26, at 75–137. The IOM Standards largely overlap with the Grading
of Recommendations, Assessment, Development, and Evaluation (“GRADE”) approach developed in 2003 and the Guidelines International Network and the World Health Organization criteria. Murad, supra note 3, at 424.
From the end of 2017 until being defunded mid-2018, the NGC published an assessment of
the extent to which each new Guideline adhered to IOM Standards (“NEATS Assessment”),
rating compliance with each of the eight IOM standards either yes or no or from poor to excellent. U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NAT’L GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE,
NATIONAL GUIDELINE CLEARINGHOUSE EXTENT ADHERENCE TO TRUSTWORTHY STANDARDS
(NEATS) INSTRUMENT (2017), available at https://www.guideline.gov/documents/neats_inst
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tific basis and trustworthiness would do more harm than good and should not
be required disclosures.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, physicians should be required to disclose Guideline recommendations to patients as part of informed consent, prior to any deviation.301
Unwarranted variations in care reflect pervasive shortcomings in physician and
patient decision making that threaten the health of Americans. Better adherence
to Guidelines could help alleviate this problem, but Guidelines will not be able
to realize their promise as long as physicians discount them and patients lack
knowledge of them.
Structuring legal and ethical obligations to nudge physicians and patients to
follow Guideline recommendations more often should minimize unjustified
variations in care, without limiting professional judgment or patient choice.
Disclosure will improve knowledge of Guidelines and help to combat cognitive
biases that cause physicians and patients to make poor choices. While disclosure will not result in perfect adherence, elevating the role of evidence-based,
consensus Guideline recommendations should improve quality of care and provide better, more understandable information to empower patient choice.302

rument.pdf [https://web.archive.org/web/20171002200826/https://www.guideline.gov/docu
ments/neats_instrument.pdf]. This NEATS Assessment allowed physicians, patients, and
policymakers to quickly and easily determine the trustworthiness of a new Guideline.
Guidelines that rate yes or at least yes or “good” on all eight IOM Standards address most
historic criticisms associated with Guidelines. They are transparent regarding the strength of
recommendation, as well as the evidence and value judgments underlying that conclusion.
Id. They minimize and disclose potential conflicts of interest and incorporate patientpreferences and patient-centered outcomes. Id. They are updated regularly. Id.
Reasonable people could disagree regarding whether or not mandatory disclosure should be
limited to Guidelines meeting this rigorous criteria or some lesser one. 81 percent of physicians want to receive recommendations even when based on “poor” strength of evidence.
Neumann et al., supra note 276, at 38–39. So, there is ample reason to believe that patients
might likewise value such information. Nonetheless, there is also reason to be concerned that
requiring disclosure of less reliable Guideline recommendations might cause confusion or
otherwise undermine broader adherence efforts. This article does not resolve this dispute but
instead identifies existing metrics that rate the trustworthiness of Guidelines, and leaves open
the question of whether or not to impose additional requirements beyond the NGC Inclusion
Criteria, and if so at what exact level, prior to mandatory disclosure.
301 Other initiatives to address macro reforms and to improve Guideline dissemination
should also be adopted to eliminate unwarranted care variances.
302 “Perfect” adherence should be understood as following the care recommendation contained in a Guideline, absent patient preference or necessary clinical variation.
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